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Abstract
A privacy-constrained information extraction problem is considered where for a pair of correlated discrete
random variables (X,Y ) governed by a given joint distribution, an agent observes Y and wants to convey to a
potentially public user as much information about Y as possible without compromising the amount of information
revealed about X . To this end, the so-called rate-privacy function is investigated to quantify the maximal amount
of information (measured in terms of mutual information) that can be extracted from Y under a privacy constraint
between X and the extracted information, where privacy is measured using either mutual information or maximal
correlation. Properties of the rate-privacy function are analyzed and information-theoretic and estimation-theoretic
interpretations of it are presented for both the mutual information and maximal correlation privacy measures. It is
also shown that the rate-privacy function admits a closed-form expression for a large family of joint distributions
of (X,Y ). Finally, the rate-privacy function under the mutual information privacy measure is considered for
the case where (X,Y ) has a joint probability density function by studying the problem where the extracted
information is a uniform quantization of Y corrupted by additive Gaussian noise. The asymptotic behavior of
the rate-privacy function is studied as the quantization resolution grows without bound and it is observed that
not all of the properties of the rate-privacy function carry over from the discrete to the continuous case.
Index Terms
Data privacy, equivocation, rate-privacy function, information theory, MMSE and additive channels, mutual
information, maximal correlation.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of user-customized services, there is an increasing desire to balance between the
need to share data and the need to protect sensitive and private information. For example, individuals who
Parts of the results in this paper were presented at the 52nd Allerton Conference on Communications, Control and Computing [5] and
the 14th Canadian Workshop on Information Theory [7].
ar
X
iv
:1
51
1.
02
38
1v
3 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
7 J
an
 20
16
2join a social network are asked to provide information about themselves which might compromise their
privacy. However, they agree to do so, to some extent, in order to benefit from the customized services
such as recommendations and personalized searches. As another example, a participatory technology
for estimating road traffic requires each individual to provide her start and destination points as well as
the travel time. However, most participating individuals prefer to provide somewhat distorted or false
information to protect their privacy. Furthermore, suppose a software company wants to gather statistical
information on how people use its software. Since many users might have used the software to handle
some personal or sensitive information -for example, a browser for anonymous web surfing or a financial
management software- they may not want to share their data with the company. On the other hand, the
company cannot legally collect the raw data either, so it needs to entice its users. In all these situations,
a tradeoff in a conflict between utility advantage and privacy breach is required and the question is how
to achieve this tradeoff. For example, how can a company collect high-quality aggregate information
about users while strongly guaranteeing to its users that it is not storing user-specific information?
To deal with such privacy considerations, Warner [49] proposed the randomized response model in
which each individual user randomizes her own data using a local randomizer (i.e., a noisy channel)
before sharing the data to an untrusted data collector to be aggregated. As opposed to conditional
security, see e.g. [9], [18], [42], the randomized response model assumes that the adversary can have
unlimited computational power and thus it provides unconditional privacy. This model, in which the
control of private data remains in the users’ hands, has been extensively studied since Warner. As a
special case of the randomized response model, Duchi et al. [19], inspired by the well-known privacy
guarantee called differential privacy introduced by Dwork et al. [20]–[22], introduced locally differential
privacy (LDP). Given a random variable X ∈ X, another random variable Z ∈Z is said to be the ε-LDP
version of X if there exists a channel Q : X → Z such that Q(B|x)
Q(B|x′) ≤ exp(ε) for all measurable B ⊂Z
and all x, x′ ∈ X. The channel Q is then called as the ε-LDP mechanism. Using Jensen’s inequality,
it is straightforward to see that any ε-LDP mechanism leaks at most ε bits of private information, i.e.,
the mutual information between X and Z satisfies I(X,Z) ≤ ε.
There have been numerous studies on the tradeoff between privacy and utility for different examples
of randomized response models with different choices of utility and privacy measures. For instance,
Duchi et al. [19] studied the optimal ε-LDP mechanism M : X → Z which minimizes the risk of
estimation of a parameter θ related to PX . Kairouz et al. [27] studied an optimal ε-LDP mechanism
3in the sense of mutual information, where an individual would like to release an ε-LDP version Z
of X that preserves as much information about X as possible. Calmon et al. [12] proposed a novel
privacy measure (which includes maximal correlation and chi-square correlation) between X and Z and
studied the optimal privacy mechanism (according to their privacy measure) which minimizes the error
probability Pr(Xˆ(Z) 6= X) for any estimator Xˆ : Z → X .
In all above examples of randomized response models, given a private source, denoted by X , the
mechanism generates Z which can be publicly displayed without breaching the desired privacy level.
However, in a more realistic model of privacy, we can assume that for any given private data X , nature
generates Y , via a fixed channel PY |X . Now we aim to release a public display Z of Y such that the
amount of information in Y is preserved as much as possible while Z satisfies a privacy constraint with
respect to X . Consider two communicating agents Alice and Bob. Alice collects all her measurements
from an observation into a random variable Y and ultimately wants to reveal this information to Bob in
order to receive a payoff. However, she is worried about her private data, represented by X , which is
correlated with Y . For instance, X might represent her precise location and Y represents measurement
of traffic load of a route she has taken. She wants to reveal these measurements to an online road
monitoring system to received some utility. However, she does not want to reveal too much information
about her exact location. In such situations, the utility is measured with respect to Y and privacy is
measured with respect to X . The question raised in this situation then concerns the maximum payoff
Alice can get from Bob (by revealing Z to him) without compromising her privacy. Hence, it is of interest
to characterize such competing objectives in the form of a quantitative tradeoff. Such a characterization
provides a controllable balance between utility and privacy.
This model of privacy first appears in Yamamoto’s work [51] in which the rate-distortion-equivocation
function is defined as the tradeoff between a distortion-based utility and privacy. Recently, Sankar et
al. [44], using the quantize-and-bin scheme [47], generalized Yamamoto’s model to study privacy in
databases from an information-theoretic point of view. Calmon and Fawaz [10] and Monedero et al.
[38] also independently used distortion and mutual information for utility and privacy, respectively, to
define a privacy-distortion function which resembles the classical rate-distortion function. More recently,
Makhdoumi et al. [34] proposed to use mutual information for both utility and privacy measures and
4defined the privacy funnel as the corresponding privacy-utility tradeoff, given by
tR(X;Y ) := min
PZ|Y :X(−Y(−Z
I(Y ;Z)≥R
I(X;Z), (1)
where X (− Y (− Z denotes that X, Y and Z form a Markov chain in this order. Leveraging
well-known algorithms for the information bottleneck problem [48], they provided a locally optimal
greedy algorithm to evaluate tR(X;Y ). Asoodeh et al. [5], independently, defined the rate-privacy
function, gε(X;Y ), as the maximum achievable I(Y ;Z) such that Z satisfies I(X;Z) ≤ ε, which is a
dual representation of the privacy funnel (1), and showed that for discrete X and Y , g0(X;Y ) > 0 if
and only if X is weakly independent of Y (cf, Definition 2). Recently, Calmon et al. [11] proved an
equivalent result for tR(X;Y ) using a different approach. They also obtained lower and upper bounds
for tR(X;Y ) which can be easily translated to bounds for gε(X;Y ) (cf. Lemma1). In this paper, we
develop further properties of gε(X;Y ) and also determine necessary and sufficient conditions on PXY ,
satisfying some symmetry conditions, for gε(X;Y ) to achieve its upper and lower bounds.
The problem treated in this paper can also be contrasted with the better-studied concept of secrecy
following the pioneering work of Wyner [50]. While in secrecy problems the aim is to keep information
secret only from wiretappers, in privacy problems the aim is to keep the private information (not
necessarily all the information) secret from everyone including the intended receiver.
A. Our Model and Main Contributions
Using mutual information as measure of both utility and privacy, we formulate the corresponding
privacy-utility tradeoff for discrete random variables X and Y via the rate-privacy function, gε(X;Y ),
in which the mutual information between Y and displayed data (i.e., the mechanism’s output), Z, is
maximized over all channels PZ|Y such that the mutual information between Z and X is no larger than
a given ε. We also formulate a similar rate-privacy function gˆε(X;Y ) where the privacy is measured in
terms of the squared maximal correlation, ρ2m, between, X and Z. In studying gε(X;Y ) and gˆε(X;Y ),
any channel Q : Y → Z that satisfies I(X;Z) ≤ ε and ρ2m(X;Z) ≤ ε, preserves the desired level of
privacy and is hence called a privacy filter. Interpreting I(Y ;Z) as the number of bits that a privacy filter
can reveal about Y without compromising privacy, we present the rate-privacy function as a formulation
of the problem of maximal privacy-constrained information extraction from Y .
5We remark that using maximal correlation as a privacy measure is by no means new as it appears in
other works, see e.g., [33], [30] and [12] for different utility functions. We do not put any likelihood
constraints on the privacy filters as opposed to the definition of LDP. In fact, the optimal privacy filters
that we obtain in this work induce channels PZ|X that do not satisfy the LDP property.
The quantity gε(X;Y ) is related to a notion of the reverse strong data processing inequality as
follows. Given a joint distribution PXY , the strong data processing coefficient was introduced in [1]
and [4], as the smallest s(X;Y ) ≤ 1 such that I(X;Z) ≤ s(X;Y )I(Y ;Z) for all PZ|Y satisfying the
Markov condition X (− Y (− Z. In the rate-privacy function, we instead seek an upper bound on
the maximum achievable rate at which Y can display information, I(Y ;Z), while meeting the privacy
constraint I(X;Z) ≤ ε. The connection between the rate-privacy function and the strong data processing
inequality is further studied in [11] to mirror all the results of [4] in the context of privacy.
The contributions of this work are as follows:
• We study lower and upper bounds of gε(X;Y ). The lower bound, in particular, establishes a
multiplicative bound on I(Y ;Z) for any optimal privacy filter. Specifically, we show that for a
given (X, Y ) and ε > 0 there exists a channel Q : Y → Z such that I(X;Z) ≤ ε and
I(Y ;Z) ≥ λ(X;Y )ε, (2)
where λ(X;Y ) ≥ 1 is a constant depending on the joint distribution PXY . We then give conditions
on PXY such that the upper and lower bounds are tight. For example, we show that the lower
bound is achieved when Y is binary and the channel from Y to X is symmetric. We show that this
corresponds to the fact that both Y = 0 and Y = 1 induce distributions PX|Y (·|0) and PX|Y (·|1)
which are equidistant from PX in the sense of Kullback-Leibler divergence. We then show that the
upper bound is achieved when Y is an erased version of X , or equivalently, PY |X is an erasure
channel.
• We propose an information-theoretic setting in which gε(X;Y ) appears as a natural upper-bound
for the achievable rate in the so-called "dependence dilution" coding problem. Specifically, we
examine the joint-encoder version of an amplification-masking tradeoff, a setting recently introduced
by Courtade [14] and we show that the dual of gε(X;Y ) upper bounds the masking rate. We
also present an estimation-theoretic motivation for the privacy measure ρ2m(X;Z) ≤ ε. In fact,
by imposing ρ2m(X;Y ) ≤ ε, we require that an adversary who observes Z cannot efficiently
6estimate f(X), for any function f . This is reminiscent of semantic security [25] in the cryptography
community. An encryption mechanism is said to be semantically secure if the adversary’s advantage
for correctly guessing any function of the privata data given an observation of the mechanism’s
output (i.e., the ciphertext) is required to be negligible. This, in fact, justifies the use of maximal
correlation as a measure of privacy. The use of mutual information as privacy measure can also be
justified using Fano’s inequality. Note that I(X;Z) ≤ ε can be shown to imply that Pr(Xˆ(Z) 6=
X) ≥ H(X)−1−ε
log(|X|) and hence the probability of adversary correctly guessing X is lower-bounded.
• We also study the rate of increase g′0(X;Y ) of gε(X;Y ) at ε = 0 and show that this rate can
characterize the behavior of gε(X;Y ) for any ε ≥ 0 provided that g0(X;Y ) = 0. This again has
connections with the results of [4]. Letting
Γ(R) := max
PZ|Y :X(−Y(−Z
I(Y ;Z)≤R
I(X;Z),
one can easily show that Γ′(0) = limR→0
Γ(R)
R
= s(X;Y ), and hence the rate of increase of Γ(R)
at R = 0 characterizes the strong data processing coefficient. Note that here we have Γ(0) = 0.
• Finally, we generalize the rate-privacy function to the continuous case where X and Y are both
continuous and show that some of the properties of gε(X;Y ) in the discrete case do not carry
over to the continuous case. In particular, we assume that the privacy filter belongs to a family
of additive noise channels followed by an M -level uniform scalar quantizer and give asymptotic
bounds as M →∞ for the rate-privacy function.
B. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define and study the rate-privacy
function for discrete random variables for two different privacy measures, which, respectively, lead to the
information-theoretic and estimation-theoretic interpretations of the rate-privacy function. In Section 3,
we provide such interpretations for the rate-privacy function in terms of quantities from information and
estimation theory. Having obtained lower and upper bounds of the rate-privacy function, in Section 4
we determine the conditions on PXY such that these bounds are tight. The rate-privacy function is then
generalized and studied in Section 5 for continuous random variables.
7II. UTILITY-PRIVACY MEASURES: DEFINITIONS AND PROPERTIES
Consider two random variables X and Y , defined over finite alphabets X andY, respectively, with a
fixed joint distribution PXY . Let X represent the private data and let Y be the observable data, correlated
with X and generated by the channel PY |X predefined by nature, which we call the observation channel.
Suppose there exists a channel PZ|Y such that Z, the displayed data made available to public users, has
limited dependence with X . Such a channel is called the privacy filter. This setup is shown in Fig. 1.
The objective is then to find a privacy filter which gives rise to the highest dependence between Y and
Z. To make this goal precise, one needs to specify a measure for both utility (dependence between Y
and Z) and also privacy (dependence between X and Z).
X Y Z
Fixed channel (observation channel) Privacy filter
Fig. 1. Information-theoretic privacy.
A. Mutual Information as Privacy Measure
Adopting mutual information as a measure of both privacy and utility, we are interested in charac-
terizing the following quantity, which we call the rate-privacy function1,
gε(X;Y ) := sup
PZ|Y ∈Dε(P )
I(Y ;Z), (3)
where (X, Y ) has fixed distribution PXY = P and
Dε(P ) := {PZ|Y : X (− Y (− Z, I(X;Z) ≤ ε},
(here X (− Y (− Z means that X, Y, and Z form a Markov chain in this order). Equivalently, we
call gε(X;Y ) the privacy-constrained information extraction function, as Z can be thought of as the
extracted information from Y under privacy constraint I(X;Z) ≤ ε.
Note that since I(Y ;Z) is a convex function of PZ|Y and furthermore the constraint set Dε(P ) is
convex, [41, Theorem 32.2] implies that we can restrict Dε(P ) in (3) to {PZ|Y : X (− Y (−
1Since mutual information is adopted for utility, the privacy-utility tradeoff characterizes the optimal rate for a given privacy level,
where rate indicates the precision of the displayed data Z with respect to the observable data Y for a privacy filter, which suggests the
name.
8Z, I(X;Z) = ε} whenever ε ≤ I(X;Y ) . Note also that since for finite X and Y, PZ|Y → I(Y ;Z) is
a continuous map, therefore Dε(P ) is compact and the supremum in (3) is indeed a maximum. In this
case, using the Support Lemma [17], one can readily show that it suffices that the random variable Z is
supported on an alphabet Z with cardinality |Z| ≤ |Y|+ 1. Note further that by the Markov condition
X (− Y (− Z, we can always restrict ε ≥ 0 to only 0 ≤ ε < I(X;Y ), because I(X;Z) ≤ I(X;Y )
and hence for ε ≥ I(X;Y ) the privacy constraint is removed and thus by setting Z = Y , we obtain
gε(X;Y ) = H(Y ).
As mentioned earlier, a dual representation of gε(X;Y ), the so called privacy funnel, is introduced
in [34] and [11], defined in (1), as the least information leakage about X such that the communication
rate is greater than a positive constant; I(Y ;Z) ≥ R for some R > 0. Note that if tR(X;Y ) = ε then
gε(X;Y ) = R.
Given ε1 < ε2 and a joint distribution P = PX × PY |X , we have Dε1(P ) ⊂ Dε2(P ) and hence
ε → gε(X;Y ) is non-decreasing, i.e., gε1(X;Y ) ≤ gε2(X;Y ). Using a similar technique as in [45,
Lemma 1], Calmon et al. [11] showed that the mapping R 7→ tR(X;Y )
R
is non-decreasing for R > 0.
This, in fact, implies that ε 7→ gε(X;Y )
ε
is non-increasing for ε > 0. This observation leads to a lower
bound for the rate privacy function gε(X;Y ) as described in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 ( [11]). For a given joint distribution P defined over X ×Y, the mapping ε 7→ gε(X;Y )
ε
is
non-increasing on ε ∈ (0,∞) and gε(X;Y ) lies between two straight lines as follows:
ε
H(Y )
I(X;Y )
≤ gε(X;Y ) ≤ H(Y |X) + ε, (4)
for ε ∈ (0, I(X;Y )).
X PY |X Y
e
Zδ
Fig. 2. Privacy filter that achieves the lower bound in (4) where Zδ is the output of an erasure privacy filter with erasure
probability specified in (5).
Using a simple calculation, the lower bound in (4) can be shown to be achieved by the privacy filter
9Fig. 3. The region of gε(X;Y ) in terms of ε specified by (4).
depicted in Fig. 2 with the erasure probability
δ = 1− ε
I(X;Y )
. (5)
In light of Lemma 1, the possible range of the map ε 7→ gε(X;Y ) is as depicted in Fig. 3. We next
show that ε 7→ gε(X;Y ) is concave and continuous.
Lemma 2. For any given pair of random variables (X, Y ) over X ×Y, the mapping ε 7→ gε(X;Y )
is concave for ε ≥ 0.
Proof. It suffices to show that for any 0 ≤ ε1 < ε2 < ε3 ≤ I(X;Y ), we have
gε3(X;Y )− gε1(X;Y )
ε3 − ε1 ≤
gε2(X;Y )− gε1(X;Y )
ε2 − ε1 , (6)
which, in turn, is equivalent to(
ε2 − ε1
ε3 − ε1
)
gε3(X;Y ) +
(
ε3 − ε2
ε3 − ε1
)
gε1(X;Y ) ≤ gε2(X;Y ). (7)
Let PZ1|Y : Y → Z1 and PZ3|Y : Y → Z3 be two optimal privacy filters in Dε1(P ) and Dε3(P ) with
disjoint output alphabets Z1 and Z3, respectively.
We introduce an auxiliary binary random variable U ∼ Bernoulli(λ), independent of (X, Y ), where
10
λ := ε2−ε1
ε3−ε1 and define the following random privacy filter PZλ|Y : We pick PZ3|Y if U = 1 and PZ1|Y
if U = 0, and let Zλ be the output of this random channel which takes values in Z1 ∪Z3. Note that
(X, Y ) (− Z (− U . Then we have
I(X;Zλ) = I(X;Zλ, U) = I(X;Zλ|U) = λI(X;Z3) + (1− λ)I(X;Z1),
≤ ε2,
which implies that PZλ|Y ∈ Dε2(P ). On the other hand, we have
gε2(X;Y ) ≥ I(Y ;Zλ) = I(Y ;Zλ, U) = I(Y ;Zλ|U) = λI(Y ;Z3) + (1− λ)I(Y ;Z1),
=
(
ε2 − ε1
ε3 − ε1
)
gε3(X;Y ) +
(
ε3 − ε2
ε3 − ε1
)
gε1(X;Y )
which, according to (7), completes the proof.
Remark 1. By the concavity of ε 7→ gε(X;Y ), we can show that gε(X;Y ) is a strictly increasing function
of ε ≤ I(X;Y ). To see this, assume there exists ε1 < ε2 ≤ I(X;Y ) such that gε1(X;Y ) = gε2(X;Y ).
Since ε 7→ gε(X;Y ) is concave, then it follows that for all ε ≥ ε2, gε(X;Y ) = gε2(X;Y ) and since for
ε = I(X;Y ), gI(X;Y )(X;Y ) = H(Y ), implying that for any ε ≥ ε2, we must have gε(X;Y ) = H(Y )
which contradicts the upper bound shown in (4).
Corollary 1. For any given pair of random variables (X, Y ) over X×Y, the mapping ε 7→ gε(X;Y )
is continuous for ε ≥ 0.
Proof. Concavity directly implies that the mapping ε 7→ gε(X;Y ) is continuous on (0,∞) (see for
example [43, Theorem 3.2]). Continuity at zero follows from the continuity of mutual information.
Remark 2. Using the concavity of the map ε 7→ gε(X;Y ), we can provide an alternative proof for the
lower bound in (4). Note that point (I(X;Y ), H(Y )) is always on the curve gε(X;Y ), and hence by
concavity, the straight line ε 7→ ε H(Y )
I(X;Y )
is always below the lower convex envelop of gε(X;Y ), i.e., the
chord connecting (0, g0(X;Y )) to (I(X;Y ), H(Y )), and hence gε(X;Y ) ≥ ε H(Y )I(X;Y ) . In fact, this chord
yields a better lower bound for gε(X;Y ) on ε ∈ [0, I(X;Y ] as
gε(X;Y ) ≥ ε H(Y )
I(X;Y )
+ g0(X;Y )
[
1− ε
I(X;Y )
]
, (8)
which reduces to the lower bound in (4) only if g0(X;Y ) = 0.
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B. Maximal Correlation as Privacy Measure
By adopting the mutual information as the privacy measure between the private and the displayed data,
we make sure that only limited bits of private information is revealed during the process of transferring
Y . In order to have an estimation theoretic guarantee of privacy, we propose alternatively to measure
privacy using a measure of correlation, the so-called maximal correlation.
Given the collection Cof all pairs of random variables (U, V ) ∈ U×V where U and V are general
alphabets, a mapping T : C → [0, 1] defines a measure of correlation [23] if T (U, V ) = 0 if and only
if U and V are independent (in short, U⊥⊥V ) and T (U, V ) attains its maximum value if X = f(Y ) or
Y = g(X) almost surely for some measurable real-valued functions f and g. There are many different
examples of measures of correlation including the Hirschfeld-Gebelein-Rényi maximal correlation [23],
[26], [39], the information measure [32], mutual information and f -divergence [16].
Definition 1 ( [39]). Given random variables X and Y , the maximal correlation2 ρm(X;Y ) is defined
as follows:
ρm(X;Y ) := sup
f,g
ρ(f(X), g(Y )) = sup
(f(X),g(Y ))∈S
E[f(X)g(Y )],
where S is the collection of pairs of real-valued random variables f(X) and g(Y ) such that Ef(X) =
Eg(Y ) = 0 and Ef 2(X) = Eg2(Y ) = 1. If S is empty (which happens precisely when at least one of X
and Y is constant almost surely) then one defines ρm(X;Y ) to be 0. Rényi [39] derived an equivalent
characterization of maximal correlation as follows:
ρ2m(X;Y ) = sup
f :Ef(X)=0,Ef2(X)=1
E
[
E2[f(X)|Y ]] . (9)
Measuring privacy in terms of maximal correlation, we propose
gˆε(X;Y ) := sup
PZ|Y ∈Dˆε(P )
I(Y ;Z),
as the corresponding rate-privacy tradeoff, where
Dˆε(P ) := {PZ|Y : X (− Y (− Z, ρ2m(X;Z) ≤ ε, PXY = P}.
2Recall that the correlation coefficient between U and V , is defined as ρ(U ;V ) := cov(U ;V )
σUσV
, where cov(U ;V ), σU and σV are the
covariance between U and V , the standard deviations of U and V , respectively.
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Again, we equivalently call gˆε(X;Y ) as the privacy-constrained information extraction function, where
here the privacy is guaranteed by ρ2m(X;Z) ≤ ε.
Setting ε = 0 corresponds to the case where X and Z are required to be statistically independent,
i.e., absolutely no information leakage about the private source X is allowed. This is called perfect
privacy. Since the independence of X and Z is equivalent to I(X;Z) = ρm(X;Z) = 0, we have
gˆ0(X;Y ) = g0(X;Y ). However, for ε > 0, both gε(X;Y ) ≤ gˆε(X;Y ) and gε(X;Y ) ≥ gˆε(X;Y ) might
happen in general. For general ε ≥ 0, it directly follows using [30, Proposition 1] that
gˆε(X;Y ) ≤ gε′(X;Y ),
where ε′ := log(kε+ 1) and k := |X| − 1.
Similar to gε(X;Y ), we see that for ε1 ≤ ε2, Dˆε1(P ) ⊂ Dˆε2(P ) and hence ε → gˆε(X;Y ) is non-
decreasing. The following lemma is a counterpart of Lemma 1 for gˆε(X;Y ).
Lemma 3. For a given joint distribution PXY defined over X ×Y, ε 7→ gˆε(X;Y )ε is non-increasing on
(0,∞).
Proof. Like Lemma 1, the proof is similar to the proof of [45, Lemma 1]. We, however, give a brief
proof for the sake of completeness.
For a given channel PZ|Y ∈ Dˆε(P ) and δ ≥ 0, we can define a new channel with an additional
symbol e as follows
PZ′|Y (z′|y) =

(1− δ)PZ|Y (z′|y) if z′ 6= e
δ if z′ = e
(10)
It is easy to check that I(Y ;Z ′) = (1 − δ)I(Y ;Z) and also ρ2m(X;Z ′) = (1 − δ)ρ2m(X;Z); see [52,
Page 8], which implies that PZ′|Y ∈ Dˆε′(P ) where ε′ = (1 − δ)ε. Now suppose that PZ|Y achieves
gˆε(X;Y ), that is, gˆε(X;Y ) = I(Y ;Z) and ρ2m(X;Z) = ε. We can then write
gˆε(X;Y )
ε
=
I(Y ;Z)
ε
=
I(Y ;Z ′)
ε′
≤ gε′(X;Y )
ε′
.
Therefore, for ε′ ≤ ε we have gε′ (X;Y )
ε′ ≥ gε(X;Y )ε .
Similar to the lower bound for gε(X;Y ) obtained from Lemma 1, we can obtain a lower bound for
gˆε(X;Y ) using Lemma 3. Before we get to the lower bound, we need a data processing lemma for
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maximal correlation. The following lemma proves a version of strong data processing inequality for
maximal correlation from which the typical data processing inequality follows, namely, ρm(X;Z) ≤
min{ρm(Y ;Z), ρm(X;Y )} for X, Y and Z satisfying X (− Y (− Z.
Lemma 4. For random variables X and Y with a joint distribution PXY , we have
sup
X(−Y(−Z
ρm(Y ;Z)6=0
ρm(X;Z)
ρm(Y ;Z)
= ρm(X;Y ).
Proof. For arbitrary zero-mean and unit variance measurable functions f ∈ L2(X) and g ∈ L2(Z)
and X (− Y (− Z, we have
E[f(X)g(Z)] = E [E[f(X)|Y ]E[g(Z)|Y ]] ≤ ρm(X;Y )ρm(Y ;Z),
where the inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and (9). Thus we obtain ρm(X;Z) ≤
ρm(X;Y )ρm(Y ;Z).
This bound is tight for the special case of X → Y → X ′, where PX′|Y is the backward channel
associated with PY |X . In the following, we shall show that ρm(X;Y )ρm(Y ;X ′) = ρm(X;X ′).
To this end, first note that the above implies that ρm(X;Y )ρm(Y ;X ′) ≥ ρm(X;X ′). Since PXY =
PX′Y , it follows that ρm(X;Y ) = ρm(Y ;X ′) and hence the above implies that ρ2m(X;Y ) ≥ ρm(X;X ′).
One the other hand, we have
E[[E[f(X)|Y ]]2] = E[E[f(X)|Y ]E[f(X ′)|Y ]] = E[E[f(X)f(X ′)|Y ]] = E[f(X)f(X ′)],
which together with (9) implies that
ρ2m(X;Y ) ≤ sup
f :Ef(X)=0,Ef2(X)=1
E[f(X)f(X ′)] ≤ ρm(X;X ′).
Thus, ρ2m(X;Y ) = ρm(X;X
′) which completes the proof.
Now a lower bound of gˆε(X;Y ) can be readily obtained.
Corollary 2. For a given joint distribution PXY defined over X ×Y, we have for any ε > 0
gˆε(X;Y ) ≥ H(Y )
ρ2m(X;Y )
min{ε, ρ2m(X;Y )}.
14
Proof. By Lemma 4, we know that for any Markov chain X (− Y (− Z, we have ρm(X;Z) ≤
ρm(X;Y ) and hence for ε ≥ ρ2m(X;Y ), the privacy constraint ρ2m(X;Z) ≤ ε is not restrictive and
hence gˆε(X;Y ) = H(Y ) by setting Y = Z. For 0 < ε ≤ ρ2m(X;Y ), Lemma 3 implies that
gˆε(X;Y )
ε
≥ H(Y )
ρ2m(X;Y )
,
from which the result follows.
A loose upper bound of gˆε(X;Y ) can be obtained using an argument similar to the one used for
gε(X;Y ). For the Markov chain X (− Y (− Z, we have
I(Y ;Z) = I(X;Z) + I(Y ;Z|X) ≤ I(X;Z) +H(Y |X),
(a)
≤ log (kρ2m(X;Z) + 1)+H(Y |X), (11)
where k := |X| − 1 and (a) comes from [30, Proposition 1]. We can, therefore, conclude from (11)
and Corollary 2 that
ε
H(Y )
ρ2m(X;Y )
≤ gˆε(X;Y ) ≤ log (kε+ 1) +H(Y |X). (12)
Similar to Lemma 2, the following lemma shows that the gˆε(X;Y ) is a concave function of ε.
Lemma 5. For any given pair of random variables (X, Y ) with distribution P overX×Y, the mapping
ε 7→ gˆε(X;Y ) is concave for ε ≥ 0.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 2 except that here for two optimal filters PZ1|Y : Y → Z1
and PZ3|Y : Y → Z3 in Dˆε1(P ) and Dˆε3(P ), respectively, and the random channel PZλ|Y : Y → Z
with output alphabet Z1 ∪Z3 constructed using a coin flip with probability γ, we need to show that
PZλ|Y ∈ Dˆε2(P ), where 0 ≤ ε1 < ε2 < ε3 ≤ ρ2m(X;Y ). To show this, consider f : X → R such that
E[f(X)] = 0 and E[f 2(X)] = 1 and let U be a binary random variable as in the proof of Lemma 2.
We then have
E[E2[f(X)|Zλ]] = E
[
E[E2[f(X)|Zλ]|U ]
]
(a)
= γE[E2[f(X)|Z3]] + (1− γ)E[E2[f(X)|Z1]], (13)
where (a) comes from the fact that U is independent of X . We can then conclude from (13) and the
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alternative characterization of maximal correlation (9) that
ρ2m(X;Zλ) = sup
f :E[f(X)]=0,E[f2(X)]=1
E[E2[f(X)|Zλ]]
= sup
f :E[f(X)]=0,E[f2(X)]=1
[
γE[E2[f(X)|Z3]] + (1− γ)E[E2[f(X)|Z1]]
]
≤ γρ2m(X;Z3) + (1− γ)ρ2m(X;Z1) ≤ γε3 + (1− γ)ε1,
from which we can conclude that PZλ|Y ∈ Dˆε2(P ).
C. Non-Trivial Filters For Perfect Privacy
As it becomes clear later, requiring that g0(X;Y ) = 0 is a useful assumption for the analysis of
gε(X;Y ). Thus, it is interesting to find a necessary and sufficient condition on the joint distribution
PXY which results in g0(X;Y ) = 0.
Definition 2 ( [8]). The random variable X is said to be weakly independent of Y if the rows of the
transition matrix PX|Y , i.e., the set of vectors {PX|Y (·|y), y ∈Y}, are linearly dependent.
The following lemma provides a necessary and sufficient condition for g0(X;Y ) > 0.
Lemma 6. For a given (X, Y ) with a given joint distribution PXY = PY × PX|Y , g0(X;Y ) > 0 (and
equivalently gˆ0(X;Y ) > 0) if and only if X is weakly independent of Y .
Proof. ⇒ direction:
Assuming that g0(X;Y ) > 0 implies that there exists a random variable Z over an alphabet Z such
that the Markov condition X (− Y (− Z is satisfied and Z⊥⊥X while I(Y ;Z) > 0. Hence, for any
z1 and z2 in Z, we must have PX|Z(x|z1) = PX|Z(x|z2) for all x ∈ X, which implies that
∑
y∈Y
PX|Y (x|y)PY |Z(y|z1) =
∑
y∈Y
PX|Y (x|y)PY |Z(y|z2)
and hence ∑
y∈Y
PX|Y (x|y)
[
PY |Z(y|z1)− PY |Z(y|z2)
]
= 0.
Since Y is not independent of Z, there exist z1 and z2 such that PY |Z(y|z1) 6= PY |Z(y|z2) and hence
the above shows that the set of vectors PX|Y (·|y), y ∈Y is linearly dependent.
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⇐ direction:
Berger and Yeung [8, Appendix II], in a completely different context, showed that if X being weakly
independent of Y , one can always construct a binary random variable Z correlated with Y which
satisfies X (− Y (− Z and X⊥⊥Z, and hence g0(X;Y ) > 0.
Remark 3. Lemma 6 first appeared in [5]. However, Calmon et al. [11] studied (1), the dual version
of gε(X;Y ), and showed an equivalent result for tR(X;Y ). In fact, they showed that for a given
PXY , one can always generate Z such that I(X;Z) = 0, I(Y ;Z) > 0 and X (− Y (− Z, or
equivalently g0(X;Y ) > 0, if and only if the smallest singular value of the conditional expectation
operator f 7→ E[f(X)|Y ] is zero. This condition can, in fact, be shown to be equivalent to the condition
in Lemma 6.
Remark 4. It is clear that, according to Definition 2, X is weakly independent of Y if |Y| > |X|.
Hence, Lemma 6 implies that g0(X;Y ) > 0 if Y has strictly larger alphabet than X .
In light of the above remark, in the most common case of |Y| = |X|, one might have g0(X;Y ) = 0,
which corresponds to the most conservative scenario as no privacy leakage implies no broadcasting
of observable data. In such cases, the rate of increase of gε(X;Y ) at ε = 0, that is g′0(X;Y ) :=
d
dεgε(X;Y )|ε=0, which corresponds to the initial efficiency of privacy-constrained information extraction,
proves to be very important in characterizing the behavior of gε(X;Y ) for all ε ≥ 0. This is because,
for example, by concavity of ε 7→ gε(X;Y ), the slope of gε(X;Y ) is maximized at ε = 0 and so
g′0(X;Y ) = lim
ε→0
gε(X;Y )
ε
= sup
ε>0
gε(X;Y )
ε
,
and hence gε(X;Y ) ≤ εg′0(X;Y ) for all ε ≤ I(X;Y ) which, together with (4), implies that gε(X;Y ) =
ε H(Y )
I(X;Y )
if g′0(X;Y ) ≤ H(Y )I(X;Y ) . In the sequel, we always assume that X is not weakly independent of Y ,
or equivalently g0(X;Y ) = 0. For example, in light of Lemma 6 and Remark 4, we can assume that
|Y| ≤ |X|.
It is easy to show that, X is weakly independent of binary Y if and only if X and Y are independent
(see e.g., [8, Remark 2]). The following corollary, therefore, immediately follows from Lemma 6.
Corollary 3. Let Y be a non-degenerate binary random variable correlated with X . Then g0(X;Y ) = 0.
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III. OPERATIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RATE-PRIVACY FUNCTION
In this section, we provide a scenario in which gε(X;Y ) appears as a boundary point of an achievable
rate region and thus giving an information-theoretic operational interpretation for gε(X;Y ). We then
proceed to present an estimation-theoretic motivation for gˆε(X;Y ).
A. Dependence Dilution
Inspired by the problems of information amplification [29] and state masking [35], Courtade [14]
proposed the information-masking tradeoff problem as follows. The tuple (Ru, Rv,∆A,∆M) ∈ R4 is
said to be achievable if for two given separated sources U ∈ U and V ∈ V and any ε > 0 there exist
mappings f : Un → {1, 2, . . . , 2nRu} and g : Vn → {1, 2, . . . , 2nRv} such that I(Un; f(Un), g(V n)) ≤
n(∆M + ε) and I(V n; f(Un), g(V n)) ≥ n(∆A − ε). In other words, (Ru, Rv,∆A,∆M) is achievable if
there exist indices K and J of rates Ru and Rv given Un and V n, respectively, such that the receiver
in possession of (K, J) can recover at most n∆M bits about Un and at least n∆A about V n. The
closure of the set of all achievable tuple (Ru, Rv,∆A,∆M) is characterized in [14]. Here, we look at a
similar problem but for a joint encoder. In fact, we want to examine the achievable rate of an encoder
observing both Xn and Y n which masks Xn and amplifies Y n at the same time, by rates ∆M and ∆A,
respectively.
We define a (2nR, n) dependence dilution code by an encoder
fn : X
n ×Yn → {1, 2, . . . , 2nR},
and a list decoder
gn : {1, 2, . . . , 2nR} → 2Yn ,
where 2Yn denotes the power set of Yn. A dependence dilution triple (R,∆A,∆M) ∈ R3+ is said to be
achievable if, for any δ > 0, there exists a (2nR, n) dependence dilution code that for sufficiently large
n satisfies the utility constraint:
Pr (Y n /∈ gn(J)) < δ (14)
having a fixed list size
|gn(J)| = 2n(H(Y )−∆A), ∀J ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2nR} (15)
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where J := fn(Xn, Y n) is the encoder’s output, and satisfies the privacy constraint:
1
n
I(Xn; J) ≤ ∆M + δ. (16)
Intuitively speaking, upon receiving J , the decoder is required to construct list gn(J) ⊂ Yn of fixed
size which contains likely candidates of the actual sequence Y n. Without any observation, the decoder
can only construct a list of size 2nH(Y ) which contains Y n with probability close to one. However, after
J is observed and the list gn(J) is formed, the decoder’s list size can be reduced to 2n(H(Y )−∆A) and
thus reducing the uncertainty about Y n by 0 ≤ n∆A ≤ nH(Y ). This observation led Kim et al. [29] to
show that the utility constraint (14) is equivalent to the amplification requirement
1
n
I(Y n; J) ≥ ∆A − δ, (17)
which lower bounds the amount of information J carries about Y n. The following lemma gives an outer
bound for the achievable dependence dilution region.
Theorem 1. Any achievable dependence dilution triple (R,∆A,∆M) satisfies
R ≥ ∆A
∆A ≤ I(Y ;U)
∆M ≥ I(X;U)− I(Y ;U) + ∆A,
for some auxiliary random variable U ∈ U with a finite alphabet and jointly distributed with X and
Y .
Before we prove this theorem, we need two preliminary lemmas. The first lemma is an extension of
Fano’s inequality for list decoders and the second one makes use of a single-letterization technique to
express I(Xn; J)− I(Y n; J) in a single-letter form in the sense of Csiszár and Körner [17].
Lemma 7 ( [2], [29]). Given a pair of random variables (U, V ) defined over U×V for finite V and
arbitrary U, any list decoder g : U → 2V, U 7→ g(U) of fixed list size m (i.e., |g(u)| = m, ∀u ∈ U),
satisfies
H(V |U) ≤ hb(pe) + pe log |V|+ (1− pe) logm,
where pe := Pr(V /∈ g(U)) and hb : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is the binary entropy function.
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This lemma, applied to J and Y n in place of U and V , respectively, implies that for any list decoder
with the property (14), we have
H(Y n|J) ≤ log |gn(J)|+ nεn, (18)
where εn := 1n + (log |Y| − 1n log |gn(J)|)pe and hence εn → 0 as n→∞.
Lemma 8. Let (Xn, Y n) be n i.i.d. copies of a pair of random variables (X, Y ). Then for a random
variable J jointly distributed with (Xn, Y n), we have
I(Xn; J)− I(Y n; J) =
n∑
i=1
[I(Xi;Ui)− I(Yi;Ui)],
where Ui := (J,Xni+1, Y
i−1).
Proof. Using the chain rule for the mutual information, we can express I(Xn; J) as follows
I(Xn; J) =
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; J |Xni+1) =
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; J,X
n
i+1)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(Xi; J,X
n
i+1, Y
i−1)− I(Xi;Y i−1|J,Xni+1)]
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ui)−
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1|J,Xni+1). (19)
Similarly, we can expand I(Y n; J) as
I(Y n; J) =
n∑
i=1
I(Yi; J |Y i−1) =
n∑
i=1
I(Yi; J, Y
i−1)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(Yi; J,X
n
i+1, Y
i−1)− I(Yi;Xni+1|J, Y i−1)]
=
n∑
i=1
I(Yi;Ui)−
n∑
i=1
I(Yi;X
n
i+1|J, Y i−1). (20)
Subtracting (20) from (19), we get
I(Xn; J)− I(Y n; J) =
n∑
i=1
[I(Xi;Ui)− I(Yi;Ui)]−
n∑
i=1
[I(Xi;Y
i−1|J,Xni+1)− I(Xni+1;Yi|J, Y i−1)]
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(Xi;Ui)− I(Yi;Ui)],
where (a) follows from the Csiszár sum identity [28].
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Proof of Theorem 1. The rate R can be bounded as
nR ≥ H(J) ≥ I(Y n; J) (21)
= nH(Y )−H(Y n|J)
(a)
≥ nH(Y )− log |gn(J)| − nεn
(b)
= n∆A − nεn, (22)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality (18) with εn → 0 as n→∞ and (b) is due to (15). We can
also upper bound ∆A as
∆A
(a)
= H(Y n)− log |gn(J)|
(b)
≤ H(Y n)−H(Y n|J) + nεn
=
n∑
i=1
H(Yi)−H(Yi|Y i−1, J) + nεn
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Yi)−H(Yi|Y i−1, Xni+1, J) + nεn
=
n∑
i=1
I(Yi;Ui) + nεn, (23)
where (a) follows from (15), (b) follows from (18), and in the last equality the auxiliary random variable
Ui := (Y
i−1, Xni+1, J) is introduced.
We shall now lower bound I(Xn; J):
n(∆M + δ) ≥ I(Xn; J)
(a)
= I(Y n; J) +
n∑
i=1
[I(Xi;Ui)− I(Yi;Ui)]
(b)
≥ n∆A +
n∑
i=1
[I(Xi;Ui)− I(Yi;Ui)]− nεn. (24)
where (a) follows from Lemma 8 and (b) is due to Fano’s inequality and (15) (or equivalently from
(17)).
Combining (22), (23) and (24), we can write
R ≥ ∆A − εn
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∆A ≤ I(YQ;UQ|Q) + εn = I(YQ;UQ, Q) + εn
∆M ≥ ∆A + I(XQ;UQ|Q)− I(YQ;UQ|Q)− ε′n
= ∆A + I(XQ;UQ, Q)− I(YQ;UQ, Q)− ε′n
where ε′n := εn + δ and Q is a random variable distributed uniformly over {1, 2, . . . , n} which is
independent of (X, Y ) and hence I(YQ;UQ|Q) = 1n
∑n
i=1 I(Yi;Ui). The results follow by denoting
U := (UQ, Q) and noting that YQ and XQ have the same distributions as Y and X , respectively.
If the encoder does not have direct access to the private source Xn, then we can define the encoder
mapping as fn : Yn → {1, 2, . . . , snR}. The following corollary is an immediate consequence of
Theorem 1.
Corollary 4. If the encoder does not see the private source, then for all achievable dependence dilution
triple (R,∆A,∆M), we have 
R ≥ ∆A
∆A ≤ I(Y ;U)
∆M ≥ I(X;U)− I(Y ;U) + ∆A,
for some joint distribution PXY U = PXY PU |Y where the auxiliary random variable U ∈ U satisfies
|U| ≤ |Y|+ 1.
Remark 5. If source Y is required to be amplified (according to (17)) at maximum rate, that is, ∆A =
I(Y ;U) for an auxiliary random variable U which satisfies X (− Y (− U , then by Corollary 4, the
best privacy performance one can expect from the dependence dilution setting is
∆∗M = min
U :X (− Y (− U
I(Y ;U)≥∆A
I(X;U), (25)
which is equal to the dual of gε(X;Y ) evaluated at ∆A, t∆A(X;Y ), as defined in (1).
The dependence dilution problem is closely related to the discriminatory lossy source coding problem
studied in [47]. In this problem, an encoder f observes (Xn, Y n) and wants to describe this source
to a decoder, g, such that g recovers Y n within distortion level D and I(f(Xn, Y n);Xn) ≤ n∆M . If
the distortion level is Hamming measure, then the distortion constraint and the amplification constraint
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are closely related via Fano’s inequality. Moreover, dependence dilution problem reduces to a secure
lossless (list decoder of fixed size 1) source coding problem by setting ∆A = H(H), which is recently
studied in [6].
B. MMSE Estimation of Functions of Private Information
In this section, we provide a justification for the privacy guarantee ρ2m(X;Z) ≤ ε. To this end, we
recall the definition of the minimum mean squared error estimation.
Definition 3. Given random variables U and V , mmse(U |V ) is defined as the minimum error of an
estimate, g(V ), of U based on V , measured in the mean-square sense, that is
mmse(U |V ) := inf
g∈L2(V)
E[(U − g(V ))2] = E[(U − E[U |V ])2] = E[var(U |V )], (26)
where var(U |V ) denotes the conditional variance of U given V .
It is easy to see that mmse(U |V ) = 0 if and only if U = f(V ) for some measurable function f
and mmse(U |V ) = var(U) if and only if U⊥⊥V . Hence, unlike for the case of maximal correlation, a
small value of mmse(U |V ) implies a strong dependence between U and V . Hence, although it is not
a "proper" measure of correlation, in a certain sense it measures how well one random variable can be
predicted from another one.
Given a non-degenerate measurable function f : X → R, consider the following constraint on
mmse(f(X)|Y )
(1− ε)var(f(X)) ≤ mmse(f(X)|Z) ≤ var(f(X)). (27)
This guarantees that no adversary knowing Z can efficiently estimate f(X). First consider the case
where f is an identity function, i.e., f(x) = x. In this case, a direct calculation shows that
mmse(X|Z) (a)= E[(X − E[X|Z])2] = E[X2]− E[(E[X|Z])2]
= var(X)(1− ρ2(X;E[X|Z]))
(b)
≥ var(X)(1− ρ2m(X;Z)),
where (a) follows from (26) and (b) is due to the definition of maximal correlation. Having imposed
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ρ2m(X;Z) ≤ ε, we, can therefore conclude that the MMSE of estimating X given Z satisfies
(1− ε)var(X) ≤ mmse(X|Z) ≤ var(X), (28)
which shows that ρ2m(X;Z) ≤ ε implies (27) for f(x) = x. However, in the following we show that the
constraint ρ2m(X;Z) ≤ ε is, indeed, equivalent to (27) for any non-degenerate measurable f : X → R.
Definition 4 ( [37]). A joint distribution PUV satisfies a Poincaré inequality with constant c ≤ 1 if for
all f : U→ R
c · var(f(U)) ≤ mmse(f(U)|V ),
and the Poincaré constant for PUV is defined as
ϑ(U ;V ) := inf
f
mmse(f(U)|V )
var(f(U))
.
The privacy constraint (27) can then be viewed as
ϑ(X;Z) ≥ 1− ε. (29)
Theorem 2 ( [37]). For any joint distribution PUV , we have
ϑ(U ;V ) = 1− ρ2m(U ;V ).
In light of Theorem 2 and (29), the privacy constraint (27) is equivalent to ρ2m(X;Z) ≤ ε, that is,
ρ2m(X;Z) ≤ ε⇐⇒ (1− ε)var(f(X)) ≤ mmse(f(X)|Z) ≤ var(f(X)),
for any non-degenerate measurable functions f : X → R.
Hence, gˆε(X;Y ) characterizes the maximum information extraction from Y such that no (non-trivial)
function of X can be efficiently estimated, in terms of MMSE (27), given the extracted information.
IV. OBSERVATION CHANNELS FOR MINIMAL AND MAXIMAL gε(X;Y)
In this section, we characterize the observation channels which achieve the lower or upper bounds
on the rate-privacy function in (4). We first derive general conditions for achieving the lower bound
and then present a large family of observation channels PY |X which achieve the lower bound. We also
give a family of PY |X which attain the upper bound on gε(X;Y ).
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A. Conditions for Minimal gε(X;Y )
Assuming that g0(X;Y ) = 0, we seek a set of conditions on PXY such that gε(X;Y ) is linear in
ε, or equivalently, gε(X;Y ) = ε
H(Y )
I(X;Y )
. In order to do this, we shall examine the slope of gε(X;Y ) at
zero. Recall that by concavity of gε(X;Y ), it is clear that g′0(X;Y ) ≥ H(Y )I(X;Y ) . We strengthen this bound
in the following lemmas. For this, we need to recall the notion of Kullback-Leibler divergence. Given
two probability distribution P and Q supported over a finite alphabet U,
D(P ||Q) :=
∑
u∈U
P (u) log
(
P (u)
Q(u)
)
. (30)
Lemma 9. For a given joint distribution PXY = PY × PX|Y , if g0(X;Y ) = 0, then for any ε ≥ 0
g′0(X;Y ) ≥ max
y∈Y
− logPY (y)
D(PX|Y (·|y)||PX(·)) .
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.
Remark 6. Note that if for a given joint distribution PXY , there exists y0 ∈Y such that D(PX|Y (·|y0)||PX(·)) =
0, it implies that PX|Y (·|y0) = PX(x). Consider the binary random variable Z ∈ {1, e} constructed
according to the distribution PZ|Y (1|y0) = 1 and PZ|Y (e|y) = 1 for y ∈ Y\{y0}. We can now claim
that Z is independent of X , because PX|Z(x|1) = PX|Y (x|y0) = PX(x) and
PX|Z(x|e) =
∑
y 6=y0
PX|Y (x|y)PY |Z(y|e) =
∑
y 6=y0
PX|Y (x|y) PY (y)
1− PY (y0)
=
1
1− PY (y0)
∑
y 6=y0
PXY (x, y) = PX(x).
Clearly, Z and Y are not independent, and hence g0(X;Y ) > 0. This implies that the right-hand side
of inequality in Lemma 9 can not be infinity.
In order to prove the main result, we need the following simple lemma.
Lemma 10. For any joint distribution PXY , we have
H(Y )
I(X;Y )
≤ max
y∈Y
− logPY (y)
D(PX|Y (·|y)||PX(x)) ,
where equality holds if and only if there exists a constant c > 0 such that− logPY (y) = cD(PX|Y (·|y)||PX(x))
for all y ∈Y.
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Proof. It is clear that
H(Y )
I(X;Y )
=
−∑y∈Y PY (y) logPY (y)∑
y∈Y PY (y)D(PX|Y (·|y)||PX(x))
≤ max
y∈Y
− logPY (y)
D(PX|Y (·|y)||PX(x)) ,
where the inequality follows from the fact that for any three sequences of positive numbers {ai}ni=1,
{bi}ni=1 and {λi}ni=1 we have
∑n
i=1 λiai∑n
i=1 λibi
≤ max1≤i≤n aibi where equality occurs if and only if aibi = c for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Now we are ready to state the main result of this subsection.
Theorem 3. For a given (X, Y ) with joint distribution PXY = PY × PX|Y , if g0(X;Y ) = 0 and
ε 7→ gε(X;Y ) is linear for 0 ≤ ε ≤ I(X;Y ), then for any y ∈Y
H(Y )
I(X;Y )
=
− logPY (y)
D(PX|Y (·|y)||PX(·)) .
Proof. Note that the fact that g0(X;Y ) = 0 and gε(X;Y ) is linear in ε is equivalent to gε(X;Y ) =
ε H(Y )
I(X;Y )
. It is, therefore, immediate from Lemmas 9 and 10 that we have
g′0(X;Y )
(a)
=
H(Y )
I(X;Y )
(b)
≤ max
y∈Y
− logPY (y)
D(PX|Y (·|y)||PX(x))
(c)
≤ g′0(X;Y ), (31)
where (a) follows from the fact that gε(X;Y ) = ε
H(Y )
I(X;Y )
and (b) and (c) are due to Lemmas 10 and 9,
respectively. The inequality in (31) shows that
H(Y )
I(X;Y )
= max
y∈Y
− logPY (y)
D(PX|Y (·|y)||PX(x)) . (32)
According to Lemma 10, (32) implies that the ratio of − logPY (y)
D(PX|Y (·|y)||PX(x)) does not depend on y ∈Y and
hence the result follows.
This theorem implies that if there exists y = y1 and y = y2 such that
logPY (y)
D(PX|Y (·|y)||PX(x)) results in two
different values, then ε 7→ gε(X, Y ) cannot achieve the lower bound in (4), or equivalently
gε(X;Y ) > ε
H(Y )
I(X;Y )
.
This, therefore, gives a necessary condition for the lower bound to be achievable. The following corollary
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simplifies this necessary condition.
Corollary 5. For a given joint distribution PXY = PY × PX|Y , if g0(X;Y ) = 0 and ε 7→ gε(X;Y ) is
linear, then the following are equivalent:
(i) Y is uniformly distributed,
(ii) D(PX|Y (·|y)||PX(·)) is constant for all y ∈Y.
Proof. (i)⇒ (ii):
From Theorem 3, we have for all y ∈Y
H(Y )
I(X;Y )
=
− log(PY (y))
D
(
PX|Y (·|y)||PX(·)
) . (33)
Letting D := D
(
PX|Y (·|y)||PX(·)
)
for any y ∈ Y, we have ∑y PY (y)D = I(X;Y ) and hence
D = I(X;Y ), which together with (33) implies that H(Y ) = − log(PY (y)) for all y ∈ Y and hence
Y is uniformly distributed.
(ii)⇒ (i):
When Y is uniformly distributed, we have from (33) that I(X;Y ) = D
(
PX|Y (·|y)||PX(·)
)
which
implies that D
(
PX|Y (·|y)||PX(·)
)
is constant for all y ∈Y.
Example 1. Suppose PY |X is a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover probability 0 < α < 1
and PX = Bernoulli(0.5). In this case, PX|Y is also a BSC with input distribution PY = Bernoulli(0.5).
Note that Corollary 3 implies that g0(X;Y ) = 0. We will show that gε(X;Y ) is linear as a function of
ε ≥ 0 for a larger family of symmetric channels (including BSC) in Corollary 6. Hence, the BSC with
uniform input nicely illustrates Corollary 5, because D(PX|Y (·|y)||PX(·)) = 1− h(α) for y ∈ {0, 1}.
Example 2. Now suppose PX|Y is a binary asymmetric channel such that PX|Y (·|0) = Bernoulli(α0),
PX|Y (·|1) = Bernoulli(α1) for some 0 < α0, α1 < 1 and input distribution PY = Bernoulli(p), 0 < p ≤
0.5. It is easy to see that if α0 +α1 = 1 then D(PX|Y (·|y)||PX(·)) does not depend on y and hence we
can conclude from Corollary 5 (noticing that g0(X;Y ) = 0) that in this case for any p < 0.5, gε(X;Y )
is not linear and hence for 0 < ε < I(X;Y )
gε(X;Y ) > ε
H(Y )
I(X;Y )
.
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In Theorem 3, we showed that when gε(X;Y ) achieves its lower bound, illustrated in (4), the slope
of the mapping ε 7→ gε(X;Y ) at zero is equal to − logPY (y)D(PX|Y (·|y)||PX(·)) for any y ∈Y. We will show in the
next section that the reverse direction is also true at least for a large family of binary-input symmetric
output channels, for instance when PY |X is a BSC, and thus showing that in this case,
g′0(X;Y ) =
− logPY (y)
D(PX|Y (·|y)||PX(·)) , ∀y ∈Y ⇐⇒ gε(X;Y ) = ε
H(Y )
I(X;Y )
, 0 ≤ ε ≤ I(X;Y ).
B. Special Observation Channels
In this section, we apply the results of last section to different joint distributions PXY . In the first
family of channels from X to Y , we look at the case where Y is binary and the reverse channel PX|Y
has symmetry in a particular sense, which will be specified later. One particular case of this family of
channels is when PX|Y is a BSC. As a family of observation channels which achieves the upper bound
of gε(X;Y ), stated in (4), we look at the class of erasure channels from X → Y , i.e., Y is an erasure
version of X .
1) Observation Channels With Symmetric Reverse: The first example of PXY that we consider for
binary Y is the so-called Binary Input Symmetric Output (BISO) PX|Y , see for example [24], [46].
Suppose Y = {0, 1} and X = {0,±1,±2, . . . ,±k}, and for any x ∈ X we have PX|Y (x|1) =
PX|Y (−x|0). This clearly implies that p0 := PX|Y (0|0) = PX|Y (0|1). We notice that with this definition
of symmetry, we can always assume that the output alphabet X = {±1,±2, . . . ,±k} has even number
of elements because we can split X = 0 into two outputs, X = 0+ and X = 0−, with PX|Y (0−|0) =
PX|Y (0+|0) = p02 and PX|Y (0−|1) = PX|Y (0+|1) = p02 . The new channel is clearly essentially equivalent
to the original one, see [46] for more details. This family of channels can also be characterized using the
definition of quasi-symmetric channels [3, Definition 4.17]. A channel W is BISO if (after making |X|
even) the transition matrix PX|Y can be partitioned along its columns into binary-input binary-output
sub-arrays in which rows are permutations of each other and the column sums are equal. It is clear that
binary symmetric channels and binary erasure channels are both BISO. The following lemma gives an
upper bound for gε(X, Y ) when PX|Y belongs to such a family of channels.
Lemma 11. If the channel PX|Y is BISO, then for ε ∈ [0, I(X;Y )],
ε
H(Y )
I(X;Y )
≤ gε(X;Y ) ≤ H(Y )− I(X;Y )− ε
C(PX|Y )
,
28
where C(PX|Y ) denotes the capacity of PX|Y .
Proof. The lower bound has already appeared in (4). To prove the upper bound note that by Markovity
X (− Y (− Z, we have for any x ∈ X and z ∈Z
PX|Z(x|z) = PX|Y (x|0)PY |Z(0|z) + PX|Y (x|1)PY |Z(1|z). (34)
Now suppose Z0 := {z : PY |Z(0|z) ≤ PY |Z(1|z)} and similarly Z1 := {z : PY |Z(1|z) ≤ PY |Z(0|z)}.
Then (34) allows us to write for z ∈Z0
PX|Z(x|z) = PX|Y (x|0)h−1b (H(Y |Z = z)) + PX|Y (x|1)(1− h−1b (H(Y |Z = z))), (35)
where h−1b : [0, 1]→ [0, 0.5] is the inverse of binary entropy function, and for z ∈Z1,
PX|Z(x|z) = PX|Y (x|0)(1− h−1b (H(Y |Z = z))) + PX|Y (x|1)h−1b (H(Y |Z = z)). (36)
Letting P⊗h−1b (H(Y |z)) and P˜⊗h−1b (H(Y |z)) denote the right-hand sides of (35) and (36), respectively,
we can, hence, write
H(X|Z) =
∑
z∈Z
PZ(z)H(X|Z = z)
(a)
=
∑
z∈Z0
PZ(z)H(P ⊗ h−1b (H(Y |Z = z))) +
∑
z∈Z1
PZ(z)H(P˜ ⊗ h−1b (H(Y |Z = z)))
(b)
≤
∑
z∈Z0
PZ(z)
[
(1−H(Y |Z = z))H(P ⊗ h−1b (0)) +H(Y |Z = z)H(P ⊗ h−1b (1))
]
+
∑
z∈Z1
PZ(z)
[
(1−H(Y |Z = z))H(P˜ ⊗ h−1b (0)) +H(Y |Z = z)H(P˜ ⊗ h−1b (1))
]
(c)
=
∑
z∈Z0
PZ(z) [(1−H(Y |Z = z))H(X|Y ) +H(Y |Z = z)H(Xunif)]
+
∑
z∈Z1
PZ(z) [(1−H(Y |Z = z))H(X|Y ) +H(Y |Z = z)H(Xunif)]
= H(X|Y )[1−H(Y |Z)] +H(Y |Z)H(Xunif),
where H(Xunif) denotes the entropy of X when Y is uniformly distributed. Here, (a) is due to (35) and
(36), (b) follows form convexity of u 7→ H(P ⊗h−1b (u))) for all u ∈ [0, 1] [13] and Jensen’s inequality.
In (c), we used the symmetry of channel PX|Y to show that H(X|Y = 0) = H(X|Y = 1) = H(X|Y ).
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Hence, we obtain
H(Y |Z) ≥ H(X|Z)−H(X|Y )
H(Xunif)−H(X|Y ) =
I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)
C(PX|Y )
,
where the equality follows from the fact that for BISO channel (and in general for any quasi-symmetric
channel) the uniform input distribution is the capacity-achieving distribution [3, Lemma 4.18]. Since
gε(X;Y ) is attained when I(X;Z) = ε, the conclusion immediately follows.
This lemma then shows that the larger the gap between I(X;Y ) and I(X;Y ′) is for Y ′ ∼ Bernoulli(0.5),
the more gε(X;Y ) deviates from its lower bound. When Y ∼ Bernoulli(0.5), then C(PY |X) = I(X;Y )
and H(Y ) = 1 and hence Lemma 11 implies that
ε
I(X;Y )
≤ gε(X;Y ) ≤ 1− I(X;Y )− ε
I(X;Y )
=
ε
I(X;Y )
,
and hence we have proved the following corollary.
Corollary 6. If the channel PX|Y is BISO and Y ∼ Bernoulli(0.5), then for any ε ≥ 0
gε(X;Y ) =
1
I(X;Y )
min{ε, I(X;Y )}.
This corollary now enables us to prove the reverse direction of Theorem 3 for the family of BISO
channels.
Theorem 4. If PX|Y is a BISO channel, then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) gε(X;Y ) = ε
H(Y )
I(X;Y )
for 0 ≤ ε ≤ I(X;Y ).
(ii) The initial efficiency of privacy-constrained information extraction is
g′0(X;Y ) =
− logPY (y)
D(PX|Y (·|y)||PX(·)) , ∀y ∈Y.
Proof. (i)⇒ (ii).
This follows from Theorem 3.
(ii)⇒ (i).
Let Y ∼ Bernoulli(p) for 0 < p < 1, and, as before, X = {±1,±2, . . . ,±k}, so that PX|Y is
determined by a 2× (2k) matrix. We then have
− logPY (0)
D(PX|Y (·|0)||PX(·)) =
log(1− p)
H(X|Y ) +∑kx=−k PX|Y (x|0) log(PX(x)) , (37)
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and
− logPY (1)
D(PX|Y (·|1)||PX(·)) =
log(p)
H(X|Y ) +∑kx=−k PX|Y (x|1) log(PX(x)) . (38)
The hypothesis implies that (37) is equal to (38), that is,
log(1− p)
H(X|Y ) +∑kx=−k PX|Y (x|0) log(PX(x)) = log(p)H(X|Y ) +∑kx=−k PX|Y (x|1) log(PX(x)) . (39)
It is shown in Appendix B that (39) holds if and only if p = 0.5. Now we can invoke Corollary 6 to
conclude that gε(X;Y ) = ε
H(Y )
I(X;Y )
.
This theorem shows that for any BISO PX|Y channel with uniform input, the optimal privacy filter is
an erasure channel depicted in Fig. 2. Note that if PX|Y is a BSC with uniform input PY = Bernoulli(0.5),
then PY |X is also a BSC with uniform input PX = Bernoulli(0.5). The following corollary specializes
Corollary 6 for this case.
Corollary 7. For the joint distribution PXPY |X = Bernoulli(0.5)×BSC(α), the binary erasure channel
with erasure probability (shown in Fig. 4)
δ(ε, α) := 1− ε
I(X;Y )
. (40)
for 0 ≤ ε ≤ I(X;Y ), is the optimal privacy filter in (3). In other words, for ε ≥ 0
gε(X;Y ) =
1
I(X;Y )
min{ε, I(X;Y )}.
Moreover, for a given 0 < α < 1
2
, PX = Bernoulli(0.5) is the only distribution for which ε 7→ gε(X;Y )
is linear. That is, for PXPY |X = Bernoulli(p)× BSC(α), 0 < p < 0.5, we have
gε(X;Y ) > ε
H(Y )
I(X;Y )
.
Proof. As mentioned earlier, since PX = Bernoulli(0.5) and PY |X is BSC(α), it follows that PX|Y is
also a BSC with uniform input and hence from Corollary 6, we have gε(X;Y ) = εI(X;Y ) . As in this case
gε(X;Y ) achieves the lower bound given in Lemma 1, we conclude from Fig. 2 that BEC(δ(ε, α)),
where δ(ε, α) = 1 − ε
I(X;Y )
, is an optimal privacy filter. The fact that PX = Bernoulli(0.5) is the
only input distribution for which ε 7→ gε(X;Y ) is linear follows from the proof of Theorem 4. In
particular, we saw that a necessary and sufficient condition for gε(X;Y ) being linear is that the ratio
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− logPY (y)
D(PX|Y (·|y)||PX(·)) is constant for all y ∈ Y. As shown before, this is equivalent to Y ∼ Bernoulli(0.5).
For the binary symmetric channel, this is equivalent to X ∼ Bernoulli(0.5).
1
0
1
0
1− α
1− α
1
0
e
1− δ(ε, α)
1− δ(ε, α)
Fig. 4. Optimal privacy filter for PY |X = BSC(α) with uniform X where δ(ε, α) is specified in (40).
The optimal privacy filter for BSC(α) and uniform X is shown in Figure 4. In fact, this corollary
immediately implies that the general lower-bound given in (4) is tight for the binary symmetric channel
with uniform X .
2) Erasure Observation Channel: Combining (8) and Lemma 1, we have for ε ≤ I(X;Y )
ε
H(Y )
I(X;Y )
+ g0(X;Y )
[
1− ε
I(X;Y )
]
≤ gε(X;Y ) ≤ H(Y |X) + ε, (41)
In the following we show that the above upper and lower bound coincide when PY |X is an erasure
channel, i.e., PY |X(x|x) = 1− δ and PY |X(e|x) = δ for all x ∈ X and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
Lemma 12. For any given (X, Y ), if PY |X is an erasure channel (as defined above), then
gε(X;Y ) = H(Y |X) + min{ε, I(X;Y )},
for any ε ≥ 0.
Proof. It suffices to show that if PY |X is an erasure channel, then g0(X;Y ) = H(Y |X). This follows,
since if g0(X;Y ) = H(Y |X), then the lower bound in (41) becomes H(Y |X) +ε and thus gε(X;Y ) =
H(Y |X) + ε.
Let |X| = m and Y = X ∪{e} where e denotes the erasure symbol. Consider the following privacy
filter to generate Z ∈Y:
PZ|Y (z|y) =

1
m
if y 6= e, z 6= e,
1 if y = z = e.
For any x ∈ X, we have
PZ|X(z|x) = PZ|Y (z|x)PY |X(x|x) + PZ|Y (z|e)PY |X(e|x) =
[
1− δ
m
]
1{z 6=e} + δ1{z=e},
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which implies Z⊥⊥X and thus I(X;Z) = 0. On the other hand, PZ(z) =
[
1−δ
m
]
1{z 6=e} + δ1{z=e}, and
therefore we have
g0(X;Y ) ≥ I(Y ;Z) = H(Z)−H(Z|Y ) = H
(
1− δ
m
, . . . ,
1− δ
m
, δ
)
− (1− δ) log(m)
= h(δ) = H(Y |X).
It then follows from Lemma 1 that g0(X;Y ) = H(Y |X), which completes the proof.
Example 3. In light of this lemma, we can conclude that if PY |X = BEC(δ), then the optimal privacy
filter is a combination of an identity channel and a BSC(α(ε, δ)), as shown in Fig. 5, where 0 ≤
α(ε, δ) ≤ 1
2
is the unique solution of
(1− δ)[hb(α ∗ p)− hb(α)] = ε, (42)
where X ∼ Bernoulli(p), p ≤ 0.5 and a ∗ b = a(1 − b) + b(1 − a). Note that it is easy to check that
I(X;Z) = (1−δ)[hb(α∗p)−hb(α)]. Therefore, in order for this channel to be a valid privacy filter, the
crossover probability, α(ε, δ), must be chosen such that I(X;Z) = ε. We note that for fixed 0 < δ < 1
and 0 < p < 0.5, the map α 7→ (1− δ)[hb(α ∗ p)− hb(α)] is monotonically decreasing on [0, 12 ] ranging
over [0, (1 − δ)hb(p)] and since ε ≤ I(X;Y ) = (1 − δ)hb(p), the solution of the above equation is
unique. Combining Lemmas 1 and 12 with Corollary 7, we can show the following extremal property
1
0
1
0
e
1− δ
1− δ
1
0
e
1− α(ε, δ)
1− α(ε, δ)
Fig. 5. Optimal privacy filter for PY |X = BEC(δ) where δ(ε, α) is specified in (42).
of the BEC and BSC channels, which is similar to other existing extremal properties of the BEC and
the BSC, see e.g., [46] and [24]. For X ∼ Bernoulli(0.5), we have for any channel PY |X ,
gε(X;Y ) ≥ ε
I(X;Y )
= gε(BSC(αˆ)),
where gε(BSC(α)) is the rate-privacy function corresponding to PXY = Bernoulli(0.5) × BSC(α) and
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αˆ := h−1b (H(X|Y )). Similarly, if X ∼ Bernoulli(p), we have for any channel PY |X with H(Y |X) ≤ 1,
gε(X;Y ) ≤ H(Y |X) + ε = gε(BEC(δˆ)),
where gε(BEC(δ)) is the rate-privacy function corresponding to PXY = Bernoulli(p) × BEC(δ) and
δˆ := h−1b (H(Y |X)).
V. RATE-PRIVACY FUNCTION FOR CONTINUOUS RANDOM VARIABLES
In this section we extend the rate-privacy function gε(X;Y ) to the continuous case. Specifically,
we assume that the private and observable data are continuous random variables and that the filter is
composed of two stages: first Gaussian noise is added and then the resulting random variable is quantized
using an M -bit accuracy uniform scalar quantizer (for some positive integer M ∈ N). These filters
are of practical interest as they can be easily implemented. This section is divided in two subsections,
in the first we discuss general properties of the rate-privacy function and in the second we study the
Gaussian case in more detail. Some observations on gˆε(X;Y ) for continuous X and Y are also given.
A. General properties of the rate-privacy function
Throughout this section we assume that the random vector (X, Y ) is absolutely continuous with
respect to the Lebesgue measure on R2. Additionally, we assume that its joint density fX,Y satisfies the
following.
(a) There exist constants C1 > 0, p > 1 and bounded function C2 : R→ R such that
fY (y) ≤ C1|y|−p,
and also for x ∈ R
fY |X(y|x) ≤ C2(x)|y|−p,
(b) E[X2] and E[Y 2] are both finite,
(c) the differential entropy of (X, Y ) satisfies h(X, Y ) > −∞,
(d) H(bY c) <∞, where bac denotes the largest integer ` such that ` ≤ a.
Note that assumptions (b) and (c) together imply that h(X, Y ), h(X) and h(Y ) are finite, i.e., the maps
x 7→ fX(x)| log fX(x)|, y 7→ fY (y)| log fY (y)| and (x, y) 7→ fX,Y (x, y)| log(fX,Y (x, y))| are integrable.
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We also assume that X and Y are not independent, since otherwise the problem to characterize gε(X;Y )
becomes trivial by assuming that the displayed data Z can equal the observable data Y .
We are interested in filters of the form QM(Y +γN) where γ ≥ 0, N ∼ N(0, 1) is a standard normal
random variable which is independent of X and Y , and for any positive integer M , QM denotes the
M -bit accuracy uniform scalar quantizer, i.e., for all x ∈ R
QM(x) =
1
2M
⌊
2Mx
⌋
.
Let Zγ = Y + γN and ZMγ = QM(Zγ) = QM(Y + γN). We define, for any M ∈N,
gε,M(X;Y ) := sup
γ≥0,
I(X;ZMγ )≤ε
I(Y ;ZMγ ), (43)
and similarly
gε(X;Y ) := sup
γ≥0,
I(X;Zγ)≤ε
I(Y ;Zγ). (44)
The next theorem shows that the previous definitions are closely related.
Theorem 5. Let ε > 0 be fixed. Then lim
M→∞
gε,M(X;Y ) = gε(X;Y ).
Proof. See Appendix C.
In the limit of large M , gε(X;Y ) approximates gε,M(X;Y ). This becomes relevant when gε(X;Y ) is
easier to compute than gε,M(X;Y ), as demonstrated in the following subsection. The following theorem
summarizes some general properties of gε(X;Y ).
Theorem 6. The function ε 7→ gε(X;Y ) is non-negative, strictly-increasing, and satisfies
lim
ε→0
gε(X;Y ) = 0 and gI(X;Y )(X;Y ) =∞.
Proof. See Apendix C.
As opposed to the discrete case, in the continuous case gε(X;Y ) is no longer bounded. In the
following section we show that ε 7→ gε(X;Y ) can be convex, in contrast to the discrete case where it
is always concave.
We can also define gˆε,M(X;Y ) and gˆε(X;Y ) for continuous X and Y , similar to (43) and (44),
but where the privacy constraints are replaced by ρ2m(X;Z
M
γ ) ≤ ε and ρ2m(X;Zγ) ≤ ε, respectively.
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It is clear to see from Theorem 6 that gˆ0(X;Y ) = g0(X;Y ) = 0 and gˆρ2(X;Y )(X;Y ) = ∞. However,
although we showed that gε(X;Y ) is indeed the asymptotic approximation of gε,M(X;Y ) for M large
enough, it is not clear that the same statement holds for gˆε(X;Y ) and gˆε,M(X;Y ).
B. Gaussian Information
The rate-privacy function for Gaussian Y has an interesting interpretation from an estimation theoretic
point of view. Given the private and observable data (X, Y ), suppose an agent is required to estimate
Y based on the output of the privacy filter. We wish to know the effect of imposing a privacy constraint
on the estimation performance.
The following lemma shows that gε(X;Y ) bounds the best performance of the predictability of Y
given the output of the privacy filter. The proof provided for this lemma does not use the Gaussianity
of the noise process, so it holds for any noise process.
Lemma 13. For any given private data X and Gaussian observable data Y , we have for any ε ≥ 0
inf
γ≥0,
I(X;Zγ)≤ε
mmse(Y |Zγ) ≥ var(Y )2−2gε(X;Y ).
Proof. It is a well-known fact from rate-distortion theory that for a Gaussian Y and its reconstruction
Yˆ
I(Y ; Yˆ ) ≥ 1
2
log
var(Y )
E[(Y − Yˆ )2] ,
and hence by setting Yˆ = E[Y |Zγ], where Zγ is an output of a privacy filter, and noting that I(Y ; Yˆ ) ≤
I(Y ;Zγ), we obtain
mmse(Y |Zγ) ≥ var(Y )2−2I(Y ;Zγ), (45)
from which the result follows immediately.
According to Lemma 13, the quantity λε(X) := 2−2gε(X;Y ) is a parameter that bounds the difficulty of
estimating Gaussian Y when observing an additive perturbation Z with privacy constraint I(X;Z) ≤ ε.
Note that 0 < λε(X) ≤ 1, and therefore, provided that the privacy threshold is not trivial (i.e, ε <
I(X;Y )), the mean squared error of estimating Y given the privacy filter output is bounded away from
zero, however the bound decays exponentially at rate of gε(X;Y ).
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To finish this section, assume that X and Y are jointly Gaussian with correlation coefficient ρ. The
value of gε(X;Y ) can be easily obtained in closed form as demonstrated in the following theorem.
Theorem 7. Let (X, Y ) be jointly Gaussian random variables with correlation coefficient ρ. For any
ε ∈ [0, I(X;Y )) we have
gε(X;Y ) =
1
2
log
(
ρ2
2−2ε + ρ2 − 1
)
.
Proof. One can always write Y = aX+N1 where a2 = ρ2
var(Y )
var(X)
and N1 is a Gaussian random variable
with mean 0 and variance σ2 = (1 − ρ2)var(Y ) which is independent of (X, Y ). On the other hand,
we have Zγ = Y + γN where N is the standard Gaussian random variable independent of (X, Y ) and
hence Zγ = aX +N1 + γN . In order for this additive channel to be a privacy filter, it must satisfy
I(X;Zγ) ≤ ε,
which implies
1
2
log
(
var(Y ) + γ2
σ2 + γ2
)
≤ ε,
and hence
γ2 ≥ 2
−2ε + ρ2 − 1
1− 2−2ε var(Y ) =: γ
∗.
Since γ 7→ I(Y ;Zγ) is strictly decreasing (cf., Appendix C), we obtain
gε(X;Y ) = I(Y ;Zγ∗) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
var(Y )
γ2
)
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
1− 2−2ε
2−2ε + ρ2 − 1
)
. (46)
According to (46), we conclude that the optimal privacy filter for jointly Gaussian (X, Y ) is an
additive Gaussian channel with signal to noise ratio
1− 2−2ε
2−2ε + ρ2 − 1 , which shows that if perfect privacy
is required, then the displayed data is independent of the observable data Y , i.e., g0(X;Y ) = 0.
Remark 7. We could assume that the privacy filter adds non-Gaussian noise to the observable data and
define the rate-privacy function accordingly. To this end, we define
gfε (X;Y ) := sup
γ≥0,
I(X;Z
f
γ )
I(Y ;Zfγ ),
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where Zfγ = Y + γMf and Mf is a noise process that has stable distribution with density f and is
independent of (X, Y ). In this case, we can use a technique similar to Oohama [36] to lower bound
gfε (X;Y ) for jointly Gaussian (X, Y ). Since X and Y are jointly Gaussian, we can write X = aY +bN
where a2 = ρ2 var(X)
var(Y )
, b =
√
(1− ρ2)varX , and N is a standard Gaussian random variable that is
independent of Y . We can apply the conditional entropy power inequality (cf., [28, Page 22]) for a
random variable Z that is independent of N , to obtain
22h(X|Z) ≥ 22h(aY |Z) + 22h(N) = a222h(Y |Z) + 2pie(1− ρ2)var(X),
and hence
2−2I(X;Z)22h(X) ≥ a222h(Y )2−2I(Y ;Z) + 2pie(1− ρ2)var(X).
Assuming Z = Zfγ and taking infimum from both sides of above inequality over γ such that I(X;Z
f
γ ) ≤
ε, we obtain
gfε (X;Y ) ≥
1
2
log
(
ρ2
2−2ε + ρ2 − 1
)
= gε(X;Y ),
which shows that for Gaussian (X, Y ), Gaussian noise is the worst stable additive noise in the sense
of privacy-constrained information extraction.
We can also calculate gˆε(X;Y ) for jointly Gaussian (X, Y ).
Theorem 8. Let (X, Y ) be jointly Gaussian random variables with correlation coefficient ρ. For any
ε ∈ [0, ρ2) we have that
gˆε(X;Y ) =
1
2
log
(
ρ2
ρ2 − ε
)
.
Proof. Since for the correlation coefficient between Y and Zγ we have for any γ ≥ 0,
ρ2(Y ;Zγ) =
var(Y )
var(Y ) + γ2
,
we can conclude that
ρ2(X;Zγ) =
ρ2var(Y )
var(Y ) + γ2
.
Since ρ2m(X;Z) = ρ
2(X;Z) (see e.g., [39]), the privacy constraint ρ2m(X;Z) ≤ ε implies that
ρ2var(Y )
var(Y ) + γ2
≤ ε,
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and hence
γ2 ≥ (ρ
2 − ε)var(Y )
ε
=: γˆ2ε .
By monotonicity of the map γ 7→ I(Y ;Zγ), we have
gˆε(X;Y ) = I(Y ;Zγˆε) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
var(Y )
γˆ2ε
)
=
1
2
log
(
ρ2
ρ2 − ε
)
.
Theorems 7 and 8 show that unlike to the discrete case (cf. Lemmas 2 and 5), ε 7→ gε(X;Y ) and
ε 7→ gˆε(X;Y ) are convex.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the problem of determining the maximal amount of information that one
can extract by observing a random variable Y , which is correlated with another random variable X that
represents sensitive or private data, while ensuring that the extracted data Z meets a privacy constraint
with respect to X . Specifically, given two correlated discrete random variables X and Y , we introduced
the rate-privacy function as the maximization of I(Y ;Z) over all stochastic ”privacy filters” PZ|Y such
that pm(X;Z) ≤ , where pm(·; ·) is a privacy measure and  ≥ 0 is a given privacy threshold. We
considered two possible privacy measure functions, pm(X;Z) = I(X;Z) and pm(X;Z) = ρ2m(X;Z)
where ρm denotes maximal correlation, resulting in the rate-privacy functions g(X;Y ) and gˆ(X;Y ),
respectively. We analyzed these two functions, noting that each function lies between easily evaluated
upper and lower bounds, and derived their monotonicity and concavity properties. We next provided
an information-theoretic interpretation for g(X;Y ) and an estimation-theoretic characterization for
gˆ(X;Y ). In particular, we demonstrated that the dual function of g(X;Y ) is a corner point of an
outer bound on the achievable region of the dependence dilution coding problem. We also showed
that gˆ(X;Y ) constitutes the largest amount of information that can be extracted from Y such that no
meaningful MMSE estimation of any function of X can be realized by just observing the extracted
information Z. We then examined conditions on PXY under which the lower bound on g(X;Y ) is
tight, hence determining the exact value of g(X;Y ). We also showed that for any given Y , if the
observation channel PY |X is an erasure channel, then g(X;Y ) attains its upper bound. Finally, we
extended the notions of the rate-privacy functions g(X;Y ) and gˆ(X;Y ) to the continuous case where
39
the observation channel consists of an additive Gaussian noise channel followed by uniform scalar
quantization.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 9
Given a joint distribution PXY defined over X×Y where X = {1, 2, . . . ,m} andY = {1, 2, . . . , n}
with n ≤ m, we consider a privacy filter specified by the following distribution for δ > 0 andZ = {k, e}
PZ|Y (k|y) = δ1{y=k} (47)
PZ|Y (e|y) = 1− δ1{y=k} (48)
where 1{·} denotes the indicator function. The system of X (− Y (− Z in this case is depicted in
Fig. 6 for the case of k = 1.
X Y Z
PY |X
...
...
1
e
δ
1−
δ
Fig. 6. The privacy filter associated with (47) and (48) with k = 1. We have PZ|Y (·|1) = Bernoulli(δ) and PZ|Y (·|y) =
Bernoulli(0) for y ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n}.
We clearly have PZ(k) = δPY (k) and PZ(e) = 1− δPY (k), and hence
PX|Z(x|k) = PXZ(x, k)
δPY (k)
=
PXY Z(x, k, k)
δPY (k)
=
δPXY (x, k)
δPY (k)
= PX|Y (x|k),
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and also,
PX|Z(x|e) = PXZ(x, e)
1− δPY (k) =
∑
y PXY Z(x, y, e)
1− δPY (k)
=
∑
y 6=k PXY Z(x, y) + (1− δ)PXY (x, k)
1− δPY (k) =
PX(x)− δPXY (x, k)
1− δPY (k) .
It, therefore, follows that for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
H(X|Z = k) = H(X|Y = k),
and
H(X|Z = e) = H
(
PX(1)− δPXY (1, k)
1− δPY (k) , . . . ,
PX(m)− δPXY (m, k)
1− δPY (k)
)
=: hX(δ).
We then write
I(X;Z) = H(X)−H(X|Z) = H(X)− δPY (k)H(X|Y = k)− (1− δPY (k))hX(δ),
and hence,
d
dδ
I(X;Z) = −PY (k)H(X|Y = k) + PY (k)hX(δ)− (1− δPY (k))h′X(δ),
where
h′X(δ) =
d
dδ
hX(δ) = −
m∑
x=1
PX(x)PY (k)− PXY (x, k)
[1− δPY (k)]2 log
(
PX(x)− δPXY (x, y)
1− δPY (k)
)
.
Using the first-order approximation of mutual information for δ = 0, we can write
I(X;Z) =
d
dδ
I(X;Z)|δ=0δ + o(δ)
= δ
[
m∑
x=1
PXY (x, k) log
(
PXY (x, k)
PX(x)PY (k)
)]
+ o(δ)
= δPY (k)D(PX|Y (·|k)||PX(·)) + o(δ). (49)
Similarly, we can write
I(Y ;Z) = h(Z)−
n∑
y=1
PY (y)h(Z|Y = y) = h(Z)− PY (k)h(δ) = h(δPY (k))− PY (k)h(δ)
= −δPY (k) log(PY (k))−Ψ(1− δPY (k)) + PY (k)Ψ(1− δ),
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where Ψ(x) := x log x which yields
d
dδ
I(Y ;Z) = −Ψ(PY (k)) + PY (k) log
(
1− δPY (k)
1− δ
)
.
From the above, we obtain
I(Y ;Z) =
d
dδ
I(Y ;Z)|δ=0δ + o(δ)
= −δΨ(PY (k)) + o(δ). (50)
Clearly from (49), in order for the filter PZ|Y specified in (47) and (48) to belong to Dε(PXY ), we must
have
ε
δ
= PY (k)D(PX|Y (·|k)||PX(·)) + o(δ)
δ
,
and hence from (50), we have
I(Y ;Z) =
−Ψ(PY (k))
PY (k)D(PX|Y (·|k)||PX(·))ε+ o(δ).
This immediately implies that
g′0(X;Y ) = lim
ε↓0
gε(X;Y )
ε
≥ −Ψ(PY (k))
PY (k)D(PX|Y (·|k)||PX(·)) =
− log(PY (k))
D
(
PX|Y (·|k)||PX(·)
) , (51)
where we have used the assumption g0(X, Y ) = 0 in the first equality.
APPENDIX B
COMPLETION OF PROOF OF THEOREM 4
To prove that the equality (39) has only one solution p = 1
2
, we first show the following lemma.
Lemma 14. Let P and Q be two distributions over X = {±1,±2, . . . ,±k} which satisfy P (x) =
Q(−x). Let Rλ := λP + (1− λ)Q for λ ∈ (0, 1). Then
D(P ||R1−λ)
D(P ||Rλ) <
log(1− λ)
log(λ)
, (52)
for λ ∈ (0, 1
2
) and
D(P ||R1−λ)
D(P ||Rλ) >
log(1− λ)
log(λ)
, (53)
for λ ∈ (1
2
, 1).
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Note that it is easy to see that the map λ 7→ D(P ||Rλ) is convex and strictly decreasing and hence
D(P ||Rλ) > D(P ||R1−λ) when λ ∈ (0, 12) and D(P ||Rλ) < D(P ||R1−λ) when λ ∈ (12 , 1). Inequality
(52) and (53) strengthen these monotonic behavior and show that D(P ||Rλ) > log(λ)log(1−λ)D(P ||R1−λ) and
D(P ||Rλ) < log(λ)log(1−λ)D(P ||R1−λ) for λ ∈ (0, 12) and λ ∈ (12 , 1), respectively.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that P (x) > 0 for all x ∈ X. Let X+ := {x ∈
X|P (X) > P (−x)}, X− := {x ∈ X|P (X) < P (−x)} and X0 := {x ∈ X|P (X) = P (−x)}. We
notice that when x ∈ X+, then −x ∈ X−, and hence |X+| = |X−| = m for a 0 < m ≤ k. After
relabelling if needed, we can therefore assume that X+ = {1, 2, . . . ,m} and X− = {−m, . . . ,−2,−1}.
We can write
D(P ||Rλ) =
k∑
x=−k
log
(
P (x)
λP (x) + (1− λ)Q(x)
)
=
k∑
x=−k
log
(
P (x)
λP (x) + (1− λ)P (−x)
)
(a)
=
m∑
x=1
[
P (x) log
(
P (x)
λP (x) + (1− λ)P (−x)
)
+ P (−x) log
(
P (−x)
λP (−x) + (1− λ)P (x)
)]
(b)
=
m∑
x=1
[
P (x) log
(
1
λ+ (1− λ)ζx
)
+ P (x)ζx log
(
1
λ+ (1−λ)
ζx
)]
(c)
=
m∑
x=1
P (x)Υ(λ, ζx) log
(
1
λ
)
,
where (a) follows from the fact that for x ∈ X0, log
(
P (x)
Rλ(x)
)
= 0 for any λ ∈ (0, 1), and in (b) and (c)
we introduced ζx :=
P (−x)
P (x)
and
Υ(λ, ζ) :=
1
log
(
1
λ
) (log( 1
λ+ (1− λ)ζ
)
+ ζ log
(
1
λ+ (1−λ)
ζ
))
.
Similarly, we can write
D(P ||R1−λ) =
k∑
x=−k
log
(
P (x)
(1− λ)P (x) + λQ(x)
)
=
k∑
x=−k
log
(
P (x)
(1− λ)P (x) + λP (−x)
)
=
m∑
x=1
[
P (x) log
(
P (x)
(1− λ)P (x) + λP (−x)
)
+ P (−x) log
(
P (−x)
(1− λ)P (−x) + λP (x)
)]
=
m∑
x=1
[
P (x) log
(
1
1− λ+ λζx
)
+ P (x)ζx log
(
1
1− λ+ λ
ζx
)]
=
m∑
x=1
P (x)Υ(1− λ, ζx) log
(
1
1− λ
)
,
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which implies that
D(P ||Rλ)
− log(λ) −
D(P ||R1−λ)
− log(1− λ) =
m∑
x=1
P (x) [Υ(λ, ζx)−Υ(1− λ, ζx)] .
Hence, in order to show (52), it suffices to verify that
Φ(λ, ζ) := Υ(λ, ζ)−Υ(1− λ, ζ) > 0, (54)
for any λ ∈ (0, 1
2
) and ζ ∈ (1,∞). Since log(λ) log(1− λ) is always positive for λ ∈ (0, 1
2
), it suffices
to show that
h(ζ) := Φ(λ, ζ) log(1− λ) log(λ) > 0, (55)
for λ ∈ (0, 1
2
) and ζ ∈ (1,∞). We have
h′′(ζ) = A(λ, ζ)B(λ, ζ), (56)
where
A(λ, ζ) :=
1 + ζ
(1− λ+ λζ)2(λ+ (1− λ)ζ)2ζ ,
and
B(λ, ζ) := λ2(1 + λ(λ− 2)(ζ − 1)2 + ζ(ζ − 1)) log(λ)− (1− λ)2(λ2(ζ − 1)2 + ζ) log(1− λ).
We have
∂2
∂ζ2
B(λ, ζ) = 2λ2(1− λ)2 log
(
λ
1− λ
)
< 0,
because λ ∈ (0, 1
2
) and hence λ < 1 − λ. This implies that the map ζ 7→ B(λ, ζ) is concave for any
λ ∈ (0, 1
2
) and ζ ∈ (1,∞). Moreover, since ζ 7→ B(λ, ζ) is a quadratic polynomial with negative leading
coefficient, it is clear that limζ→∞B(λ, ζ) = −∞. Consider now g(λ) := B(λ, 1) = λ2 log(λ) − (1 −
λ)2 log(1−λ). We have limλ→0 g(λ) = g(12) = 0 and g′′(λ) = 2 log
(
λ
1−λ
)
< 0 for λ ∈ (0, 1
2
). It implies
that λ 7→ g(λ) is concave over (0, 1
2
) and hence g(λ) > 0 over (0, 1
2
) which implies that B(λ, 1) > 0.
This together with the fact that ζ 7→ B(λ, ζ) is concave and it approaches to −∞ as ζ → ∞ imply
that there exists a real number c = c(λ) > 1 such that B(λ, ζ) > 0 for all ζ ∈ (1, c) and B(λ, ζ) < 0
for all ζ ∈ (c,∞). Since A(λ, ζ) > 0, it follows from (56) that ζ 7→ h(ζ) is convex over (1, c) and
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concave over (c,∞). Since h(1) = h′(1) = 0 and limζ→∞ h(ζ) = ∞, we can conclude that h(ζ) > 0
over (1,∞). That is, Φ(λ, ζ) > 0 and thus Υ(λ, ζ)−Υ(1− λ, ζ) > 0, for λ ∈ (0, 1
2
) and ζ ∈ (1,∞).
The inequality (53) can be proved by (52) and switching λ to 1− λ.
Letting P (·) = PX|Y (·|1) and Q(·) = PX|Y (·|0) and λ = Pr(Y = 1) = p, we have Rp(x) = PX(x) =
pP (x) + (1 − p)Q(x) and R1−p = PX(−x) = (1 − p)P (x) + pQ(x). Since D(PX|Y (·|0)||PX(·)) =
D(P ||R1−p), we can conclude from Lemma 14 that
D(PX|Y (·|0)||PX(·))
− log(1− p) <
D(PX|Y (·|1)||PX(·))
− log(p) ,
over p ∈ (0, 1
2
) and
D(PX|Y (·|0)||PX(·))
− log(1− p) >
D(PX|Y (·|1)||PX(·))
− log(p) ,
over p ∈ (1
2
, 1), and hence equation (39) has only solution p = 1
2
.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREMS 5 AND 6
The proof of Theorem 6 does not depend on the proof of Theorem 5, so, there is no harm in proving
the former theorem first. The following version of the data-processing inequality will be required.
Lemma 15. Let X and Y be absolutely continuous random variables such that X , Y and (X, Y ) have
finite differential entropies. If V is an absolutely continuous random variable independent of X and Y ,
then
I(X;Y + V ) ≤ I(X;Y )
with equality if and only if X and Y are independent.
Proof. Since X (− Y (− (Y + V ), the data processing inequality implies that I(X;Y + V ) ≤
I(X;Y ). It therefore suffices to show that this inequality is tight if and only X and Y are independent.
It is known that data processing inequality is tight if and only if X (− (Y + V ) (− Y . This is
equivalent to saying that for any measurable set A ⊂ R and for PY+V almost all z, Pr(X ∈ A|Y +V =
z, Y = y) = Pr(X ∈ A|Y + V = z). On the other hand, due to the independence of V and (X, Y ), we
have Pr(X ∈ A|Y + V = z, Y = y) = Pr(X ∈ A|Y = z − v). Hence, the equality holds if and only if
Pr(X ∈ A|Y +V = z) = Pr(X ∈ A|Y = z− v) which implies that X and Y must be independent.
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Lemma 16. In the notation of Section V-A, the function γ 7→ I(Y ;Zγ) is strictly-decreasing and
continuous. Additionally, it satisfies
I(Y ;Zγ) ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
var(Y )
γ2
)
.
with equality if and only if Y is Gaussian. In particular, I(Y ;Zγ)→ 0 as γ →∞.
Proof. Recall that, by assumption b), var(Y ) is finite. The finiteness of the entropy of Y follows from
assumption, the corresponding statement for Y + γN follows from a routine application of the entropy
power inequality [15, Theorem 17.7.3] and the fact that var(Y + γN) = var(Y ) + γ2 < ∞, and for
(Y, Y +γN) the same conclusion follows by the chain rule for differential entropy. The data processing
inequality, as stated in Lemma 15, implies
I(Y ;Zγ+δ) ≤ I(Y ;Y + γN) = I(Y ;Zγ).
Clearly Y and Y + γN are not independent, therefore the inequality is strict and thus γ 7→ I(Y, Zγ) is
strictly-decreasing.
Continuity will be studied for γ = 0 and γ > 0 separately. Recall that h(γN) = 1
2
log(2pieγ2). In
particular, lim
γ→0
h(γN) = −∞. The entropy power inequality shows then that lim
γ→0
I(Y ;Y + γN) = ∞.
This coincides with the convention I(Y ;Z0) = I(Y ;Y ) =∞. For γ > 0, let (γn)n≥1 be a sequence of
positive numbers such that γn → γ. Observe that
I(Y ;Zγn) = h(Y + γnN)− h(γnN) = h(Y + γnN)−
1
2
log(2pieγ2n).
Since lim
n→∞
1
2
log(2pieγ2n) =
1
2
log(2pieγ2), we only have to show that h(Y + γnN) → h(Y + γN) as
n→∞ to establish the continuity at γ. This, in fact, follows from de Bruijn’s identity (cf., [15, Theorem
17.7.2]).
Since the channel from Y to Zγ is an additive Gaussian noise channel, we have I(Y ;Zγ) ≤
1
2
log
(
1 +
var(Y )
γ2
)
with equality if and only if Y is Gaussian. The claimed limit as γ → 0 is clear.
Lemma 17. The function γ 7→ I(X;Zγ) is strictly-decreasing and continuous. Moreover, I(X;Zγ)→ 0
when γ →∞.
Proof. The proof of the strictly-decreasing behavior of γ 7→ I(X;Zγ) is proved as in the previous
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lemma.
To prove continuity, let γ ≥ 0 be fixed. Let (γn)n≥1 be any sequence of positive numbers converging
to γ. First suppose that γ > 0. Observe that
I(X;Zγn) = h(Y + γnN)− h(Y + γnN |X)
for all n ≥ 1. As shown in Lemma 16, h(Y + γnN)→ h(Y + γN) as n→∞. Therefore, it is enough
to show that h(Y + γnN |X)→ h(Y + γN |X) as n→∞. Note that by de Bruijn’s identity, we have
h(Y + γnN |X = x)→ h(Y + γN |X = x) as n→∞ for all x ∈ R. Note also that since
h(Zγn|X = x) ≤
1
2
log (2pievar(Zγn|x)) ,
we can write
h(Zγn|X) ≤ E
[
1
2
log(2pievar(Zγn|X))
]
≤ 1
2
log (2pieE[var(Zγn|X)]) ,
and hence we can apply dominated convergence theorem to show that h(Y +γnN |X)→ h(Y +γN |X)
as n→∞.
To prove the continuity at γ = 0, we first note that Linder and Zamir [31, Page 2028] showed that
h(Y + γnN |X = x) → h(Y |X = x) as n → ∞, then, as before, by dominated convergence theorem
we can show that h(Y + γnN |X) → h(Y |X). Similarly [31] implies that h(Y + γnN) → h(Y ). This
concludes the proof of the continuity of γ 7→ I(X;Zγ).
Furthermore, by the data processing inequality and previous lemma,
0 ≤ I(X;Zγ) ≤ I(Y ;Zγ) ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
var(Y )
γ2
)
,
and hence we conclude that lim
γ→∞
I(X;Zγ) = 0.
Proof of Theorem 6. The nonnegativity of gε(X;Y ) follows directly from definition.
By Lemma 17, for every 0 < ε ≤ I(X;Y ) there exists a unique γε ∈ [0,∞) such that I(X;Zγε) = ε,
so gε(X;Y ) = I(Y ;Zγε). Moreover, ε 7→ γε is strictly decreasing. Since γ 7→ I(Y ;Zγ) is strictly-
decreasing, we conclude that ε 7→ gε(X;Y ) is strictly increasing.
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The fact that ε 7→ γε is strictly decreasing, also implies that γε →∞ as ε→ 0. In particular,
lim
ε→0
gε(X;Y ) = lim
ε→0
I(Y ;Zγε) = lim
γε→∞
I(Y ;Zγε) = lim
γ→∞
I(Y ;Zγ) = 0.
By the data processing inequality we have that I(X;Zγ) ≤ I(X;Y ) for all γ ≥ 0, i.e., any filter satisfies
the privacy constraint for ε = I(X;Y ). Thus, gI(X;Y )(X;Y ) ≥ I(Y ;Y ) =∞.
In order to prove Theorem 5, we first recall the following theorem by Rényi [40].
Theorem 9 ( [40]). If U is an absolutely continuous random variable with density fU(x) and if
H(bUc) <∞, then
lim
n→∞
H(n−1bnUc)− log(n) = −
∫
R
fU(x) log fU(x)dx,
provided that the integral on the right hand side exists.
We will need the following consequence of the previous theorem.
Lemma 18. If U is an absolutely continuous random variable with density fU(x) and if H(bUc) <∞,
then H(QM(U))−M ≥ H(QM+1(U))− (M + 1) for all M ≥ 1 and
lim
n→∞
H(QM(U))−M = −
∫
R
fU(x) log fU(x)dx,
provided that the integral on the right hand side exists.
The previous lemma follows from the fact that QM+1(U) is constructed by refining the quantization
partition for QM(U).
Lemma 19. For any γ ≥ 0,
lim
M→∞
I(X;ZMγ ) = I(X;Zγ) and lim
M→∞
I(Y ;ZMγ ) = I(Y ;Zγ).
Proof. Observe that
I(X;ZMγ ) = I(X;QM(Y + γN))
= H(QM(Y + γN))−H(QM(Y + γN)|X)
= [H(QM(Y + γN))−M ]−
∫
R
fX(x)[H(QM(Y + γN)|X = x)−M ]dx.
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By the previous lemma, the integrand is decreasing in M , and thus we can take the limit with respect
to M inside the integral. Thus,
lim
M→∞
I(X;ZMγ ) = h(Y + γN)− h(Y + γN |X) = I(X;Zγ).
The proof for I(Y ;ZMγ ) is analogous.
Lemma 20. Fix M ∈ N. Assume that fY (y) ≤ C|y|−p for some positive constant C and p > 1. For
integer k and γ ≥ 0, let
pk,γ := Pr
(
QM(Y + γN) =
k
2M
)
.
Then
pk,γ ≤ C2
(p−1)M+p
kp
+ 1{γ>0}
γ2M+1
k
√
2pi
e−k
2/22M+3γ2 .
Proof. The case γ = 0 is trivial, so we assume that γ > 0. For notational simplicity, let ra = a2M for
all a ∈ Z. Assume that k ≥ 0. Observe that
pk,γ =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
fγN(n)fY (y)1[rk,rk+1)(y + n)dydn
=
∫ ∞
−∞
e−n
2/2γ2√
2piγ2
Pr (Y ∈ [rk, rk+1)− n) dn.
We will estimate the above integral by breaking it up into two pieces.
First, we consider
rk
2∫
−∞
e−n
2/2γ2√
2piγ2
Pr (Y ∈ [rk, rk+1)− n) dn.
When n ≤ rk
2
, then rk − n ≥ rk/2. By the assumption on the density of Y ,
Pr (Y ∈ [rk, rk+1)− n) ≤ C
2M
(rk
2
)−p
.
(The previous estimate is the only contribution when γ = 0.) Therefore,
rk
2∫
−∞
e−n
2/2γ2√
2piγ2
Pr (Y ∈ [rk, rk+1)− n) dn ≤ C
2M
(rk
2
)−p rk2∫
−∞
e−n
2/2γ2√
2piγ2
dn
≤ C2
(p−1)M+p
kp
.
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Using the trivial bound Pr (Y ∈ [rk, rk+1)− n) ≤ 1 and well known estimates for the error function,
we obtain that
∞∫
rk
2
e−n
2/2γ2√
2piγ2
Pr (Y ∈ [rk, rk+1)− n) dn < 1√
2pi
2γ
rk
e−r
2
k/8γ
2
=
γ2M+1
k
√
2pi
e−k
2/22M+3γ2 .
Therefore,
pk,γ ≤ C2
(p−1)M+p
kp
+
γ2M+1
k
√
2pi
e−k
2/22M+3γ2 .
The proof for k < 0 is completely analogous.
Lemma 21. Fix M ∈ N. Assume that fY (y) ≤ C|y|−p for some positive constant C and p > 1. The
mapping γ 7→ H(QM(Y + γN)) is continuous.
Proof. Let (γn)n≥1 be a sequence of non-negative real numbers converging to γ0. First, we will prove
continuity at γ0 > 0. Without loss of generality, assume that γn > 0 for all n ∈ N. Define γ∗ =
inf{γn|n ≥ 1} and γ∗ = sup{γn|n ≥ 1}. Clearly 0 < γ∗ ≤ γ∗ <∞. Recall that
pk,γ =
∫
R
e−z
2/2γ2√
2piγ2
Pr
(
Y ∈
[
k
2M
,
k + 1
2M
)
− z
)
dz.
Since, for all n ∈N and z ∈ R,
e−z
2/2γ2n√
2piγ2n
Pr
(
Y ∈
[
k
2M
,
k + 1
2M
)
− z
)
≤ e
−z2/2(γ∗)2√
2piγ2∗
,
the dominated convergence theorem implies that
lim
n→∞
pk,γn = pk,γ0 . (57)
The previous lemma implies that for all n ≥ 0 and |k| > 0,
pk,γn ≤
C2(p−1)M+p
kp
+
γn2
M+1
k
√
2pi
e−k
2/22M+3γ2n .
Thus, for k large enough, pk,γn ≤
A
kp
for a suitable positive constant A that does not depend on n.
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Since the function x 7→ −x log(x) is increasing in [0, 1/2], there exists K ′ > 0 such that for |k| > K ′
−pk,γn log(pk,γn) ≤
A
kp
log(A−1kp).
Since
∑
|k|>K′
A
kp
log(A−1kp) <∞, for any  > 0 there exists K such that
∑
|k|>K
A
kp
log(A−1kp) < .
In particular, for all n ≥ 0,
H(Q(Y + γnN))−
∑
|k|≤K
−pk,γn log(pk,γn) =
∑
|k|>K
−pk,γn log(pk,γn) < .
Therefore, for all n ≥ 1,
|H(Q(Y + γnN))−H(Q(Y + γ0N))|
≤
∑
|k|>K
−pk,γn log(pk,γn) +
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
|k|≤K
pk,γ0 log(pk,γ0)− pk,γn log(pk,γn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∑
|k|>K
−pk,γ0 log(pk,γ0)
≤ +
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
|k|≤K
pk,γ0 log(pk,γ0)− pk,γn log(pk,γn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ .
By continuity of the function x 7→ −x log(x) on [0, 1] and equation (57), we conclude that
lim sup
n→∞
|H(Q(Y + γnN))−H(Q(Y + γ0N))| ≤ 3.
Since  is arbitrary,
lim
n→∞
H(Q(Y + γnN)) = H(Q(Y + γ0N)),
as we wanted to prove.
To prove continuity at γ0 = 0, observe that equation (57) holds in this case as well. The rest is
analogous to the case γ0 > 0.
Lemma 22. The functions γ 7→ I(X;ZMγ ) and γ 7→ I(Y ;ZMγ ) are continuous for each M ∈N.
Proof. Since H(QM(Y + γN)|Y = y) and H(QM(Y + γN)|X = x) for x, y ∈ R are bounded by
M , and fY |X(y|x) satisfies assumption (b), the conclusion follows from the dominated convergence
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theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5. For every M ∈ N, let ΓM := {γ ≥ 0|I(X;ZMγ ) ≤ }. The Markov chain
X → Y → Zγ → ZM+1γ → ZMγ and the data processing inequality imply that
I(X;Zγ) ≥ I(X;ZM+1γ ) ≥ I(X;ZMγ ),
and, in particular,
 = I(X;Zγ) ≥ I(X;ZM+1γ ) ≥ I(X;ZMγ ),
where γ is as defined in the proof of Theorem 6. This implies then that
γ ∈ ΓM+1 ⊂ ΓM , (58)
and thus
I(Y ;ZMγ ) ≤ g,M(X;Y ).
Taking limits in both sides, Lemma 19 implies
g(X;Y ) = I(Y ;Zγ) ≤ lim inf
M→∞
g,M(X;Y ). (59)
Observe that
g,M(X;Y ) = sup
γ∈ΓM
I(Y ;ZMγ )
≤ sup
γ∈ΓM
I(Y ;Zγ)
= I(Y ;ZγM,min), (60)
where inequality follows from Markovity and γM,min := infΓM γ. By equation (58), γ ∈ ΓM+1 ⊂ ΓM
and in particular γM,min ≤ γM+1,min ≤ γ. Thus, {γMε,min} is an increasing sequence in M and bounded from
above and, hence, has a limit. Let γ,min = lim
M→∞
γM,min. Clearly
γ,min ≤ γ. (61)
By the previous lemma we know that I(X;ZMγ ) is continuous, so Γ
M
 is closed for all M ∈ N.
Thus, we have that γM,min = minΓM γ and in particular γ
M
,min ∈ ΓM . By the inclusion ΓM+1 ⊂ ΓM , we
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have then that γM+n,min ∈ ΓM for all n ∈N. By closedness of ΓM we have then that γ,min ∈ ΓM for all
M ∈N. In particular,
I(X;ZMγ,min) ≤ ,
for all M ∈N. By Lemma 19,
I(X;Zγ,min) ≤  = I(X;Zγ),
and by the monotonicity of γ 7→ I(X;Zγ), we obtain that γ ≤ γ,min. Combining the previous inequality
with (61) we conclude that γ,min = γ. Taking limits in the inequality (60)
lim sup
M→∞
g,M(X;Y ) ≤ lim sup
M→∞
I(Y ;ZγM,min) = I(Y ;Zγ,min).
Plugging γ,min = γ in above we conclude that
lim sup
M→∞
g,M(X;Y ) ≤ I(Y ;Zγ) = g(X;Y )
and therefore lim
M→∞
g,M(X;Y ) = g(X;Y ).
